trailofbits/skills

trailmark-finding-triage

Performs graph-assisted triage of a single security finding, SARIF result, weAudit annotation, suspicious function, or report excerpt using Trailmark reachability, entrypoint paths, taint, privilege-boundary, blast-radius, caller/callee, and neighborhood ev…

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Trailmark Finding Triage

Build a concise graph evidence packet for one candidate finding. This skill answers whether the affected code is reachable, what graph evidence supports or weakens the claim, and what manual review is still required before calling the issue exploitable.

When to Use

  • Triage one static-analysis result before spending PoC time
  • Check whether a manual finding is entrypoint-reachable
  • Build an evidence packet for PoC work
  • Review a single suspicious function discovered during manual audit
  • Decide whether one issue should be promoted, deprioritized, or treated as

part of a broader chain analysis

When NOT to Use

  • Multiple weak findings might compose into a stronger chain. Use a chain or

composition workflow instead.

  • The user wants a full audit. Use an audit or design-review workflow instead.
  • The user wants remediation verification for a known finding. Use a

remediation-review workflow instead.

  • The target is a PR or branch diff. Use graph-evolution plus a differential

review workflow.

  • No concrete finding, function, file/line, or suspicious sink exists yet. Use

discovery skills first.

Rationalizations to Reject

RationalizationWhy It Is WrongRequired Action
"The scanner says high severity, so reachability is obvious"Static findings need graph and code context before promotionBind the finding to a graph node and check entrypoint paths
"No entrypoint path means impossible"It may mean parser, proxy, or dynamic dispatch limitationsReport the limitation separately from reachability
"An auth check appears on the path, so the issue is safe"The check may enforce the wrong predicate or be bypassed by another pathTreat validation/auth as review targets, not proof
"One reachable path is enough for a PoC claim"The path still needs attacker-controlled inputs and compatible preconditionsSeparate graph reachability from exploitability
"This is probably a chain"Single-finding triage stops at one candidateHand off related findings to a composition workflow

Workflow

Finding Triage Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Normalize the candidate
- [ ] Step 2: Build or reuse the Trailmark graph
- [ ] Step 3: Bind the candidate to graph node(s)
- [ ] Step 4: Analyze reachability, taint, boundaries, and blast radius
- [ ] Step 5: Decide and emit the evidence packet

Step 1: Normalize the Candidate

Accept file/line, function name, SARIF result, weAudit annotation, Markdown finding excerpt, or a manual claim. Normalize it to:

  • title
  • source type
  • file path and line range if present
  • function or node hint
  • suspected source, sink, or asset
  • claimed impact

If there is no concrete code anchor, stop and ask for one.

For input handling details, see references/input-normalization.md.

Step 2: Build Or Reuse The Graph

Use the public trailmark skill workflow. Prefer an existing fresh exported graph or .trailmark/ artifact when present. Otherwise build a graph with language="auto" or the target's explicit language list, then run engine.preanalysis().

Record the Trailmark version or feature probes used. Feature-gate Trailmark 0.4-only APIs with hasattr() or CLI help checks.

Step 3: Bind The Candidate

Bind by file and line overlap first, then function name plus file. If several nodes match, list every candidate and select the narrowest enclosing node as primary. If no node matches, report a binding limitation instead of guessing.

SARIF and weAudit users should reuse the audit-augmentation workflow for matching and then inspect the annotated node.

Step 4: Analyze Graph Evidence

Run the query recipe in references/query-recipes.md:

  • entrypoint paths to the bound node
  • trust level of each path when available
  • membership in tainted, privilege_boundary, and high_blast_radius

subgraphs

  • direct callers and callees
  • high-impact downstream sinks
  • sibling or nearby nodes worth manual review

Do not treat graph reachability as proof of exploitability.

Step 5: Decide And Handoff

Produce one verdict:

VerdictMeaning
PromoteGraph evidence supports reachability and plausible impact
Needs manual reviewEvidence is suggestive but not decisive
DeprioritizeNo reachable path or only trusted/internal paths found
BlockedBinding or Trailmark analysis failed

Write the evidence packet using references/output-format.md.

Hand off promoted PoC-worthy issues to the user's PoC workflow. Hand off related findings to a composition workflow. Hand off repeatable root causes to trailmark-variant-neighborhood, variant-analysis, or a custom Semgrep/CodeQL rule workflow.

Example Prompts

  • "Use Trailmark finding triage on src/Vault.sol:148; I think withdraw can

bypass the balance update."

  • "Triage this SARIF result before I spend PoC time: `semgrep:error

unchecked-transfer in contracts/Bridge.sol` line 91."

  • "This report excerpt claims parse_packet is attacker reachable. Build the

Trailmark evidence packet and tell me what is still missing."

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