v4-security-foundations

v4 Hook Security Foundations

Security-first guide for building Uniswap v4 hooks. Hook vulnerabilities can drain user funds—understand these concepts before writing any hook code.

Threat Model

Before writing code, understand the v4 security context:

Permission Flags Risk Matrix

All 14 hook permissions with associated risk levels:

Risk Thresholds

• LOW: Unlikely to cause fund loss
• MEDIUM: Requires careful implementation
• HIGH: Can cause fund loss if misimplemented
• CRITICAL: Can enable complete fund theft

CRITICAL: NoOp Rug Pull Attack

The BEFORE_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA permission (bit 10) is the most dangerous hook permission. A malicious hook can:

1. Return a delta claiming it handled the entire swap
2. PoolManager accepts this and settles the trade
3. Hook keeps all input tokens without providing output
4. User loses entire swap amount

Attack Pattern

// MALICIOUS - DO NOT USE
function beforeSwap(
    address,
    PoolKey calldata,
    IPoolManager.SwapParams calldata params,
    bytes calldata
) external override returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    // Claim to handle the swap but steal tokens
    int128 amountSpecified = int128(params.amountSpecified);
    BeforeSwapDelta delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(amountSpecified, 0);
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, delta, 0);
}

Detection

Before interacting with ANY hook that has beforeSwapReturnDelta: true:

1. Audit the hook code - Verify legitimate use case
2. Check ownership - Is it upgradeable? By whom?
3. Verify track record - Has it been audited by reputable firms?
4. Start small - Test with minimal amounts first

Legitimate Uses

NoOp patterns are valid for:

• Just-in-time liquidity (JIT)
• Custom AMM curves
• Intent-based trading systems
• RFQ/PMM integrations

But each requires careful implementation and audit.

Delta Accounting Fundamentals

v4 uses a credit/debit system through the PoolManager:

Core Invariant

For every transaction: sum(deltas) == 0

The PoolManager tracks what each address owes or is owed. At transaction end, all debts must be settled.

Key Functions

Settlement Pattern

// Correct pattern: sync before settle
poolManager.sync(currency);
currency.transfer(address(poolManager), amount);
poolManager.settle(currency);

Common Mistakes

1. Forgetting sync: Settlement fails without sync
2. Wrong order: Must sync → transfer → settle
3. Partial settlement: Leaves transaction in invalid state
4. Double settlement: Causes accounting errors

Access Control Patterns

PoolManager Verification

Every hook callback MUST verify the caller:

modifier onlyPoolManager() {
    require(msg.sender == address(poolManager), "Not PoolManager");
    _;
}

function beforeSwap(
    address sender,
    PoolKey calldata key,
    IPoolManager.SwapParams calldata params,
    bytes calldata hookData
) external override onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    // Safe to proceed
}

Why This Matters

Without this check:

• Anyone can call hook functions directly
• Attackers can manipulate hook state
• Funds can be drained through fake callbacks

Router Verification Patterns

The sender parameter is the router, not the end user. For hooks that need user identity:

Allowlisting Pattern

mapping(address => bool) public allowedRouters;

function beforeSwap(
    address sender,  // This is the router
    PoolKey calldata key,
    IPoolManager.SwapParams calldata params,
    bytes calldata hookData
) external override onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    require(allowedRouters[sender], "Router not allowed");
    // Proceed with swap
}

User Identity via hookData

function beforeSwap(
    address sender,
    PoolKey calldata key,
    IPoolManager.SwapParams calldata params,
    bytes calldata hookData
) external override onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    // Decode user address from hookData (router must include it)
    address user = abi.decode(hookData, (address));
    // CAUTION: Router must be trusted to provide accurate user
}

msg.sender Trap

// WRONG - msg.sender is always PoolManager in hooks
function beforeSwap(...) external {
    require(msg.sender == someUser); // Always fails or wrong
}

// CORRECT - Use sender parameter
function beforeSwap(address sender, ...) external {
    require(allowedRouters[sender], "Invalid router");
}

Token Handling Hazards

Not all tokens behave like standard ERC-20s:

Safe Balance Check Pattern

function safeTransferIn(
    IERC20 token,
    address from,
    uint256 amount
) internal returns (uint256 received) {
    uint256 balanceBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));
    token.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), amount);
    received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - balanceBefore;
}

Base Hook Template

Start with all permissions disabled. Enable only what you need:

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;

import {BaseHook} from "v4-periphery/src/base/hooks/BaseHook.sol";
import {Hooks} from "v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol";
import {IPoolManager} from "v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol";
import {PoolKey} from "v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol";
import {BeforeSwapDelta, BeforeSwapDeltaLibrary} from "v4-core/src/types/BeforeSwapDelta.sol";

contract SecureHook is BaseHook {
    constructor(IPoolManager _poolManager) BaseHook(_poolManager) {}

    function getHookPermissions() public pure override returns (Hooks.Permissions memory) {
        return Hooks.Permissions({
            beforeInitialize: false,
            afterInitialize: false,
            beforeAddLiquidity: false,
            afterAddLiquidity: false,
            beforeRemoveLiquidity: false,
            afterRemoveLiquidity: false,
            beforeSwap: false,           // Enable only if needed
            afterSwap: false,            // Enable only if needed
            beforeDonate: false,
            afterDonate: false,
            beforeSwapReturnDelta: false,      // DANGER: NoOp attack vector
            afterSwapReturnDelta: false,       // DANGER: Can extract value
            afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta: false,
            afterRemoveLiquidityReturnDelta: false
        });
    }

    // Implement only the callbacks you enabled above
}

See references/base-hook-template.md for a complete implementation template.

Security Checklist

Before deploying any hook:

Gas Budget Guidelines

Hook callbacks execute inside the PoolManager's transaction context. Excessive gas consumption can make swaps revert or become economically unviable.

Gas Budgets by Callback

Common Gas Pitfalls

1. Unbounded loops: Iterating over dynamic arrays (e.g., all active positions) can exceed block gas limits. Cap array sizes or use pagination.
2. SSTORE in hot paths: Each new storage slot costs ~20,000 gas. Prefer transient storage (tstore/tload) for data that doesn't persist beyond the transaction. Requires Solidity >= 0.8.24 with EVM target set to cancun or later.
3. External calls: Each cross-contract call adds ~2,600 gas base cost plus the callee's execution. Batch calls where possible.
4. String operations: Avoid string manipulation in callbacks; use bytes32 for identifiers.
5. Redundant reads: Cache poolManager calls — repeated getSlot0() or getLiquidity() reads cost gas each time.

Measuring Gas

# Profile a specific hook callback with Foundry
forge test --match-test test_beforeSwapGas --gas-report

# Snapshot gas usage across all tests
forge snapshot --match-contract MyHookTest

Risk Scoring System

Calculate your hook's risk score (0-33):

Audit Tier Recommendations

Absolute Prohibitions

Never do these things in a hook:

1. Never trust `msg.sender` for user identity - It's always PoolManager
2. Never enable `beforeSwapReturnDelta` without understanding NoOp attacks
3. Never store passwords, keys, or PII on-chain
4. Never use `transfer()` for ETH - Use call{value:}("")
5. Never assume token decimals - Always query the token
6. Never use `block.timestamp` for randomness
7. Never hardcode gas limits in calls
8. Never ignore return values from external calls
9. Never use `tx.origin` for authorization - It's a phishing vector; malicious contracts can relay calls with the original user's tx.origin

Pre-Deployment Audit Checklist

See references/audit-checklist.md for detailed audit requirements.

Production Hook References

Learn from audited, production hooks:

External Resources

Official Documentation

• v4-core Repository
• v4-periphery Repository
• Uniswap v4 Docs
• Hook Permissions Guide

Security Resources

• Trail of Bits Audits
• Certora v4 Analysis
• ABDK Consulting

Community

• v4-hooks-skill by @igoryuzo - Community skill that inspired this guide
• v4hooks.dev - Community hook resources

Additional References

• Base Hook Template - Complete implementation starter
• Vulnerabilities Catalog - Common patterns and mitigations
• Audit Checklist - Detailed pre-deployment checklist