Mode d’emploi
- Copiez la commande et examinez le paquet avant de l’installer dans votre environnement agent.
- Consultez le document original pour les outils, identifiants et environnements requis.
- Décrivez les entrées et le livrable souhaité ; comparez la sortie aux sources.
npx skills add https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc --skill rails-securityAvant de commencer
- L’installation n’inclut ni abonnement au modèle, ni quota API, ni accès aux fichiers.
- Étoiles et installations reflètent l’activité, pas un test indépendant de qualité ou de sécurité.
Rendu depuis le dépôt source en conservant titres, exemples, code, tableaux, liens et images.
Rails Security
Security practices for Ruby on Rails applications (Rails 7.1+ and 8.x). Rails is secure by default in most places; the vulnerabilities that reach production usually come from opting out of a default rather than failing to add protection. This skill is the "how." For the decisions about which control to reach for, see the Ruby security rules — rules/ruby/security.md in this repository, installed as rules/ecc/ruby/security.md.
When to Activate
- Writing or reviewing authentication, sessions, or account recovery
- Adding authorization checks to controllers or views
- Handling user input, file uploads, or webhook payloads
- Configuring a Rails app for production
- Reviewing a PR that touches
config/,app/controllers/, orGemfile - Any use of
html_safe,raw,Arel.sql, or raw SQL strings
Production Configuration
# config/environments/production.rb
Rails.application.configure do
config.force_ssl = true
# Only use when all requests pass through a proxy that rejects or redirects HTTP.
config.assume_ssl = true # behind a proxy that terminates TLS
# Reject requests with unexpected Host headers.
config.hosts << "example.com"
config.hosts << /.*\.example\.com/
config.action_dispatch.cookies_same_site_protection = :lax
config.log_level = :info
endFilter sensitive values out of logs:
# config/initializers/filter_parameter_logging.rb
Rails.application.config.filter_parameters += %i[
passw secret token _key crypt salt certificate otp ssn cvv card_number
]Authentication
Rails 8 ships an authentication generator that produces session-based auth with password reset and metadata tracking:
bin/rails generate authenticationUse Devise when you need OAuth, MFA, confirmable, lockable, or multi-model auth. For hand-rolled auth, has_secure_password handles bcrypt hashing:
class User < ApplicationRecord
has_secure_password
validates :email, presence: true, uniqueness: { case_sensitive: false }
validates :password, length: { minimum: 12 }, allow_nil: true
endauthenticate_by looks up and verifies in one call, so a missing user and a wrong password take the same time:
# Bad: the timing difference reveals whether the email exists
user = User.find_by(email: params[:email])
if user&.authenticate(params[:password])
# Good
user = User.authenticate_by(email: params[:email], password: params[:password])Rotate the session on sign-in and on any privilege change:
class SessionsController < ApplicationController
def create
user = User.authenticate_by(email: params[:email], password: params[:password])
return render :new, status: :unprocessable_entity unless user
reset_session
session[:user_id] = user.id
redirect_to root_path
end
def destroy
reset_session
redirect_to root_path
end
endAccount recovery
Password reset tokens must expire, be single-use, and not reveal whether an account exists. Signed tokens generated by the model give you both:
class User < ApplicationRecord
generates_token_for :password_reset, expires_in: 15.minutes do
password_salt&.last(10) # invalidates the token once the password changes
end
end
user = User.find_by_token_for(:password_reset, params[:token])Render the same response whether or not the address matched.
Authorization
Authentication is not authorization. Every action that touches a record must check that the current user may act on it.
# Bad: any signed-in user can load any invoice
@invoice = Invoice.find(params[:id])
# Good: scope through the owner
@invoice = current_user.invoices.find(params[:id])For anything past ownership, use a policy object (Pundit, Action Policy, or CanCanCan):
class InvoicePolicy < ApplicationPolicy
def update?
user.admin? || record.user_id == user.id
end
end
class InvoicesController < ApplicationController
def update
@invoice = Invoice.find(params[:id])
authorize @invoice
# ...
end
endFail closed — verify that authorization ran rather than trusting each action to remember:
class ApplicationController < ActionController::Base
include Pundit::Authorization
after_action :verify_authorized, except: :index
after_action :verify_policy_scoped, only: :index
end
# Public actions have no record to authorize, so exempt them explicitly.
class SessionsController < ApplicationController
skip_after_action :verify_authorized
endStrong Parameters and Mass Assignment
Never pass raw params to a model. Permit an explicit list:
# Bad: a crafted request can set admin
User.new(params[:user])
# Good
def user_params
params.require(:user).permit(:email, :name)
endRails 8 adds expect, which raises on a malformed structure instead of returning an empty hash:
def user_params
params.expect(user: [:email, :name])
endAttributes such as admin, role, user_id, and account_id should never appear in a permit list driven by request data. Assign them explicitly from the session or a checked policy.
SQL Injection
Active Record parameterizes by default. Injection appears when a string is built by hand:
# Bad
User.where("email = '#{params[:email]}'")
Order.order("#{params[:sort]} #{params[:dir]}")
# Good
User.where(email: params[:email])
User.where("email = ?", params[:email])order, pluck, group, and select accept raw SQL and are not sanitized. Allowlist the input rather than escaping it:
SORTABLE = { "created_at" => "created_at", "total" => "total" }.freeze
DIRECTIONS = { "asc" => "ASC", "desc" => "DESC" }.freeze
column = SORTABLE.fetch(params[:sort], "created_at")
direction = DIRECTIONS.fetch(params[:dir], "DESC")
Order.order(Arel.sql("#{column} #{direction}"))LIKE needs its own escaping, since % and _ are wildcards:
term = User.sanitize_sql_like(params[:q])
User.where("name LIKE ?", "%#{term}%")XSS and Output Escaping
ERB escapes interpolated values by default. Every bypass is security-sensitive:
<%# Bad: renders attacker-controlled markup %>
<%= @comment.body.html_safe %>
<%= raw @comment.body %>
<%# Good: escaped %>
<%= @comment.body %>
<%# Good: allowlisted markup when the field is genuinely rich text %>
<%= sanitize @comment.body, tags: %w[p br strong em a], attributes: %w[href] %>html_safe does not sanitize — it marks a string as already safe and skips escaping. Only call it on strings you constructed.
Interpolating into JavaScript needs the matching escape, not the HTML one:
<script>
const payload = <%= raw @data.to_json %>; // Bad
const payload = <%= raw json_escape(@data.to_json) %>; // Good
</script>link_to's href accepts javascript: URLs, so validate user-supplied links:
uri = URI.parse(url) rescue nil
safe = uri.is_a?(URI::HTTP) # URI::HTTPS subclasses URI::HTTPSet a Content Security Policy:
# config/initializers/content_security_policy.rb
Rails.application.configure do
config.content_security_policy do |policy|
policy.default_src :self
policy.script_src :self
policy.object_src :none
policy.frame_ancestors :none
end
endCSRF
Rails enables CSRF protection for new apps. Keep it on, and do not exempt actions to make a client work:
# Bad: disables protection for every action in the controller
skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_tokenIf an endpoint genuinely cannot carry the token — a third-party webhook, say — authenticate it another way (signature verification) and scope the exemption to that action alone.
API-only controllers inheriting from ActionController::API have no cookie session, so CSRF does not apply; token or session-cookie APIs still need it.
File Uploads
The content_type a client sends is attacker-controlled, and blob.content_type is not a substitute for it. Active Storage derives that column through Marcel::MimeType.for, which treats the client's declared type as one candidate alongside magic-byte detection and keeps it when the bytes match nothing known — so opaque bytes declared image/png are stored as image/png with identified? true. Inspect the stored bytes yourself:
module Uploads
Rejected = Class.new(StandardError)
MAGIC = {
"application/pdf" => "%PDF-".b,
"image/png" => "\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n".b,
"image/jpeg" => "\xFF\xD8\xFF".b
}.freeze
ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = %w[.pdf .png .jpg .jpeg].freeze
MAX_BYTES = 10.megabytes
def self.verified!(blob)
# Fail closed: an object that is missing or still pending cannot be inspected.
raise Rejected, "could not be verified" unless blob.service.exist?(blob.key)
raise Rejected, "is too large" if blob.byte_size > MAX_BYTES
extension = File.extname(blob.filename.to_s).downcase
raise Rejected, "extension not allowed" unless ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS.include?(extension)
head = blob.service.download_chunk(blob.key, 0...8)
raise Rejected, "type not allowed" unless MAGIC.any? { |_mime, magic| head.start_with?(magic) }
blob
end
endThe check reads from storage, so it has to run where the bytes already exist. A form upload is not yet in storage when model validations run — Active Storage uploads on save — so upload explicitly first, and attach only what passed:
# Form upload
blob = ActiveStorage::Blob.create_and_upload!(io: params[:file], filename: params[:file].original_filename)
document.file.attach(Uploads.verified!(blob))
# Direct upload: the client already stored the object, so verify before the record
# points at it.
document.file.attach(Uploads.verified!(ActiveStorage::Blob.find_signed!(params[:file])))Attach to a private service — a public bucket makes every upload world-readable regardless of the checks above.
has_one_attached :file, service: :private_documentsrails_blob_url and url_for(attachment) are stable references that never expire; they redirect to a short-lived service URL, so anyone holding one keeps access. Serve user-scoped files from your own controller that authorizes each request, with config.active_storage.draw_routes = false, which removes every default Active Storage route; apps using direct uploads need a replacement route:
get "documents/:id/file", to: "document_files#show", as: :document_file
# Rails' direct-upload endpoint has no authentication of its own. This example uses a
# hand-rolled session sign-in; see Devise or the Rails 8 generator for their equivalents.
constraints ->(req) { req.session[:user_id].present? } do
post "uploads", to: "active_storage/direct_uploads#create", as: :rails_direct_uploads
end
class DocumentPolicy < ApplicationPolicy
def show?
record.user_id == user.id
end
end
class DocumentFilesController < ApplicationController
def show
document = current_user.documents.find(params[:id])
authorize document, :show?
redirect_to document.file.blob.url(expires_in: 5.minutes), allow_other_host: true
end
endNever interpolate a user-supplied path into send_file:
# Bad: path traversal
send_file Rails.root.join("storage", params[:name])API Security
Rate-limit authentication and other abusable endpoints. Action Controller ships rate_limit from Rails 7.2; use rack-attack on 7.1 or for app-wide throttling:
class SessionsController < ApplicationController
rate_limit to: 10, within: 3.minutes, only: :create
endVerify webhook signatures with a constant-time comparison:
class WebhooksController < ApplicationController
skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: :create
def create
expected = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest("SHA256", ENV.fetch("WEBHOOK_SECRET"), request.raw_post)
given = request.headers["X-Signature"].to_s
unless ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(expected, given)
return head :unauthorized
end
event_id = JSON.parse(request.raw_post).fetch("id")
delivery = WebhookDelivery.create_or_find_by!(provider: "billing", delivery_id: event_id)
return head :ok if delivery.processed_at?
ProcessWebhookJob.perform_later(delivery.id, request.raw_post)
head :ok
end
endadd_index :webhook_deliveries, %i[provider delivery_id], unique: trueThe job marks processed_at when it finishes. Jobs retry, so perform must be idempotent for the same reason. Requires a stable id in the signed body.
Keep CORS narrow — never reflect an arbitrary origin alongside credentials:
# Bad
origins "*"
# Good
origins "https://app.example.com"Serialize responses explicitly so new columns do not leak:
# Bad: ships every column, including ones added later
render json: @user
# Good
render json: @user.as_json(only: %i[id name created_at])Secrets and Credentials
Secrets belong in Rails credentials, environment variables, or a secret manager:
bin/rails credentials:edit --environment productionconfig/credentials/production.key must stay out of version control. Read secrets through Rails.application.credentials or ENV.fetch — ENV[...] returns nil and fails silently when a variable is missing:
# Bad
ENV["STRIPE_SECRET"]
# Good
Rails.application.credentials.dig(:stripe, :secret)
ENV.fetch("STRIPE_SECRET")If a key is ever committed, rotate it. Removing the commit does not un-expose it.
Untrusted Boundaries
Controller params are not the only entry point. Job arguments, webhook payloads, Action Cable messages, and Turbo Stream targets all carry outside data:
- Pass record IDs to jobs and re-scope inside
perform; a queued job runs without the
original request's session.
- Authorize in
ApplicationCable::Connectionand in each channel'ssubscribed. - Never build a Turbo Stream target from user input.
class ExportJob < ApplicationJob
def perform(user_id, invoice_id)
user = User.find(user_id)
invoice = user.invoices.find(invoice_id) # scoped, not Invoice.find
# ...
end
endDependency Scanning
Run these when the lockfile changes, and in CI:
bundle exec bundle-audit check --update
bundle exec brakeman --no-progressBrakeman flags the patterns above statically. Treat new warnings as blocking, and record deliberate exceptions in config/brakeman.ignore with a reason rather than lowering the confidence threshold.
Verification Checklist
- [ ]
force_sslandconfig.hostsset in production - [ ] Sensitive parameters filtered from logs
- [ ] Sessions rotated on sign-in and privilege change
- [ ] Every record lookup scoped to the current user or checked by a policy
- [ ] No permit list contains a role, ownership, or account column
- [ ] No raw SQL string interpolation;
orderandpluckinputs allowlisted - [ ] Every
html_safeandrawreviewed - [ ] CSRF exemptions scoped to specific actions with another auth mechanism
- [ ] Uploads validated against stored bytes, not
blob.content_type, and fail closed when the object is unavailable - [ ] Auth endpoints rate-limited; webhook signatures compared in constant time
- [ ] No secrets in version control; master key excluded
- [ ]
bundle-auditandbrakemanclean
Related Skills
rails-patterns— the architectural patterns these controls sit insidesecurity-review— secure-by-default review patterns across languages- Ruby security rules (
rules/ruby/security.md, installed asrules/ecc/ruby/security.md)
— the decisions and when-to-use guidance this skill implements