wpultimatesecurity/wordpress-security-skills

shortcode-block-security

Use when registering a shortcode with addshortcode or a dynamic block with a rendercallback, or processing shortcode / block attributes.

Voir la source

Mode d’emploi

  1. Copiez la commande et examinez le paquet avant de l’installer dans votre environnement agent.
  2. Consultez le document original pour les outils, identifiants et environnements requis.
  3. Décrivez les entrées et le livrable souhaité ; comparez la sortie aux sources.
npx skills add https://github.com/wpultimatesecurity/wordpress-security-skills --skill shortcode-block-security

Avant de commencer

  • L’installation n’inclut ni abonnement au modèle, ni quota API, ni accès aux fichiers.
  • Étoiles et installations reflètent l’activité, pas un test indépendant de qualité ou de sécurité.
Document Skill original

Rendu depuis le dépôt source en conservant titres, exemples, code, tableaux, liens et images.

Shortcode & dynamic block security

When to use this skill

Use this skill whenever code renders content from shortcodes or dynamic blocks:

  • Registering a shortcode with add_shortcode().
  • Reading or outputting shortcode attributes ($atts) or enclosed content ($content).
  • Registering a dynamic block with a render_callback.
  • Reading block attributes in a server-side render.
  • Building HTML, URLs, or classes from shortcode/block input.

Shortcodes and dynamic blocks are stored XSS sinks: a contributor enters [my_card title="<script>..."] and the render callback echoes it unescaped. Every attribute must be sanitized and every output escaped.

Related: see the output-escaping skill for context-correct escaping and the gutenberg-block-editor-security skill for broader block-editor surfaces.

Core principles (and why they matter)

  1. `shortcode_atts()` sets defaults; it does NOT sanitize. The returned array still holds

raw user input. Sanitize each value before use.

  1. Block attributes are user input too. Declaring type: 'string' in block.json does not

escape HTML or JavaScript for you; sanitize on render.

  1. Escape at render for the exact context. HTML body → esc_html(). HTML attribute →

esc_attr(). URL → esc_url(). Rich HTML → wp_kses_post() with an allowlist.

  1. Do not store unescaped attribute values. If you persist them, sanitize on save and escape

on read.

  1. Never pass shortcode/block input to `do_shortcode()` or `eval()` uncontrolled. Both can

execute arbitrary shortcodes or code.

  1. Return, don't echo. Shortcode and block render callbacks must return strings; echoing

produces unexpected output placement.

Step-by-step implementation

  1. In the shortcode callback, call shortcode_atts() with a complete default map.
  2. Sanitize each attribute to its expected type (absint, sanitize_text_field, esc_url_raw,

sanitize_key).

  1. In a block render_callback, read attributes from the $attributes array and sanitize them

the same way.

  1. Build the markup by concatenating escaped values.
  2. Return the complete markup string.
  3. For rich content, use wp_kses_post() or a tightly scoped wp_kses() allowlist.

Supporting references

ReferenceLoad when
Shortcode & dynamic block security checklistBefore final verification of the shortcode & dynamic block security controls.
Secure shortcode and dynamic blockImplementing shortcode and dynamic-block render callbacks with validated attributes and escaped markup.

Common AI mistakes / anti-patterns

Mistake 1 — Echoing $atts directly

php
// ❌ Insecure: stored XSS through the title attribute.
function my_plugin_card_shortcode( $atts ) {
    return '<div class="card"><h3>' . $atts['title'] . '</h3></div>';
}
php
// ✅ Secure: default, then sanitize, then escape.
function my_plugin_card_shortcode( $atts ) {
    $atts = shortcode_atts(
        array(
            'title' => '',
            'link'  => '',
        ),
        $atts,
        'my_plugin_card'
    );

    $title = sanitize_text_field( $atts['title'] );
    $link  = esc_url_raw( $atts['link'] );

    $output = '<div class="card">';
    if ( $link ) {
        $output .= '<h3><a href="' . esc_url( $link ) . '">' . esc_html( $title ) . '</a></h3>';
    } else {
        $output .= '<h3>' . esc_html( $title ) . '</h3>';
    }
    $output .= '</div>';

    return $output;
}

Mistake 2 — Trusting shortcode_atts() to sanitize

php
// ❌ Insecure: shortcode_atts only supplies defaults and filters unknown keys.
$atts = shortcode_atts( array( 'class' => '' ), $atts );
echo '<div class="' . $atts['class'] . '">...</div>';
php
// ✅ Secure: sanitize the value after normalizing it.
$atts  = shortcode_atts( array( 'class' => '' ), $atts, 'my_plugin_box' );
$class = sanitize_html_class( $atts['class'] );
echo '<div class="' . esc_attr( $class ) . '">...</div>';

Mistake 3 — Dynamic block render callback echoing attributes

php
// ❌ Insecure: block attributes echoed raw.
function my_plugin_render_banner( $attributes ) {
    ?>
    <div class="banner" style="background: <?php echo $attributes['bgColor']; ?>">
        <?php echo $attributes['heading']; ?>
    </div>
    <?php
}
php
// ✅ Secure: sanitize attributes and escape for the output context.
function my_plugin_render_banner( $attributes ) {
    $bg_color = isset( $attributes['bgColor'] ) ? sanitize_hex_color( $attributes['bgColor'] ) : '#ffffff';
    $heading  = isset( $attributes['heading'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( $attributes['heading'] ) : '';

    return sprintf(
        '<div class="banner" style="background: %s"><h2>%s</h2></div>',
        esc_attr( $bg_color ),
        esc_html( $heading )
    );
}

Mistake 4 — Allowing arbitrary HTML through attributes

php
// ❌ Insecure: an attacker can inject script/event handlers.
function my_plugin_render_note( $attributes ) {
    return '<div>' . $attributes['content'] . '</div>';
}
php
// ✅ Secure: constrain rich markup with wp_kses_post.
function my_plugin_render_note( $attributes ) {
    $content = isset( $attributes['content'] ) ? $attributes['content'] : '';
    return '<div>' . wp_kses_post( $content ) . '</div>';
}

Mistake 5 — Running do_shortcode() on untrusted input

php
// ❌ Insecure: executes arbitrary shortcodes supplied by a visitor.
echo do_shortcode( $_POST['content'] );
php
// ✅ Secure: do not run do_shortcode on user input; if required, sanitize first.
$content = wp_kses_post( wp_unslash( $_POST['content'] ?? '' ) );

Correct code examples

A complete secure shortcode and dynamic-block render callback is in `references/secure-shortcode-block.php`.

Checklist

  • [ ] shortcode_atts() provides defaults for every supported attribute.
  • [ ] Each shortcode attribute is sanitized to its expected type after normalization.
  • [ ] Block attributes are sanitized inside render_callback, not trusted from block.json types.
  • [ ] All rendered output is escaped for its context (esc_html, esc_attr, esc_url, wp_kses_post).
  • [ ] CSS classes use sanitize_html_class() (or esc_attr() with an allowlist).
  • [ ] Colors use sanitize_hex_color() where appropriate.
  • [ ] The callback returns a string; it does not echo directly.
  • [ ] do_shortcode() is never run on untrusted input.

Official references

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