briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills

incident-triage

Guide rapid triage and initial response to security incidents following NIST SP 800-61 methodology.

ソースを見る

使い方

  1. インストールコマンドをコピーし、自分の環境へ導入する前にソースを確認します。
  2. 必要なツール、認証情報、対応環境を原文で確認します。
  3. 入力と成果物を指定し、出力を資料と照合します。
npx skills add https://github.com/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills --skill incident-triage

開始前の確認

  • 導入にはモデル契約、API枠、ファイルへのアクセス許可は含まれません。
  • スター数や導入数は活動の指標であり、独立した品質・安全性試験ではありません。
リポジトリの原文

見出し、例、コード、表、リンク、参照画像を含む原文を表示しています。

Incident Triage — Security Incident Response

Guide rapid triage and initial response to security incidents. Follow NIST SP 800-61 methodology.

Cross-references: siem-detection for the rules that produced the alert this triage is responding to, disk-forensics for deeper disk and memory analysis once a host is contained, breach-patterns for the post-incident pattern extraction that hardens against recurrence, soc-operations for the operational layer above this skill (runbooks, escalation, handoff), security-comms for the stakeholder / customer notifications the response generates, privacy-engineering / hipaa-audit / pci-audit for the regulatory-clock determination when personal data, PHI, or cardholder data is involved, ai-risk-management for AI-specific incident classes (model failure, fairness drift, jailbreak exploitation in production).

Priorities (in order)

  1. Preserve human safety
  2. Contain the incident to prevent further damage
  3. Preserve evidence for investigation
  4. Identify root cause and scope
  5. Document everything

Step 1: Classification

Determine incident type:

  • Malware: ransomware, trojan, worm, cryptominer
  • Unauthorized access: compromised credentials, exploitation
  • Data exfiltration: data theft, insider threat
  • Denial of service
  • Web compromise: defacement, skimming, backdoor
  • Phishing / social engineering

Determine severity:

  • Critical: active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading, critical system compromise
  • High: confirmed compromise, malware detected, unauthorized access
  • Medium: suspicious activity, potential indicators, failed attacks
  • Low: policy violation, reconnaissance detected, likely false positive

Step 2: Initial Containment

Based on type and severity:

  • Network: block suspicious IPs/domains at firewall
  • Host: isolate affected system (network disconnect, NOT power off — volatile memory is evidence)
  • Account: disable compromised accounts, force password resets
  • Application: disable affected service if safe to do so

Critical: Do NOT power off systems. Volatile memory contains evidence.

Step 3: Evidence Preservation

Capture in order of volatility (most volatile first):

bash
# 1. Running processes
ps auxf                         # Linux
tasklist /v                     # Windows

# 2. Network connections
ss -tupn                        # Linux
netstat -anob                   # Windows

# 3. Logged-in users
who -a                          # Linux
query user                      # Windows

# 4. Open files
lsof -nP                        # Linux

# 5. System logs
journalctl --since "1 hour ago" # Linux/systemd

If memory forensics tools are available (LiME, WinPmem), capture a memory dump before anything else.

Step 4: Initial Analysis

For each suspicious indicator, document:

  • What: describe the artifact
  • When: timestamps in UTC
  • Where: affected system(s)
  • How: how it was detected

Common analysis:

  • Process tree: look for unusual process names, paths, or parent-child relationships
  • Network indicators: unusual outbound connections, DNS queries to suspicious domains, beaconing patterns (regular intervals)
  • File indicators: recently modified files in unusual locations, hidden files, new executables
  • Log analysis: authentication failures, privilege escalation, service changes, cleared logs
  • Persistence: crontab, systemd units, registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, startup items

Step 5: IOC Extraction

Extract and document all indicators of compromise:

TypeExamples
IP addressesSource and destination IPs
DomainsC2 domains, phishing domains
File hashesMD5 and SHA256 of suspicious files
File pathsMalware locations, dropped files
Email addressesPhishing sender addresses
URLsMalicious URLs, C2 endpoints
User agentsUnusual or known-malicious user agents

Output Format

markdown
# Incident Triage Report
## Incident ID: [ID]
## Date/Time: [UTC]
## Severity: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
## Classification: [incident type]
## Status: [Triage/Contained/Analyzing/Resolved]

### Summary
[2-3 sentence overview]

### Affected Systems
| Hostname | IP | Role | Status |
|----------|-----|------|--------|

### Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source | Notes |
|------------|-------|--------|-------|

### Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
|------|-------|---------|------------|

### Containment Actions Taken
- [ ] [Action and result]

### Evidence Preserved
| Type | Location | Hash | Notes |
|------|----------|------|-------|

### Recommended Next Steps
1. [Immediate priority]
2. [Short-term action]
3. [Follow-up investigation]

### Escalation Checklist
- [ ] Management notified
- [ ] Legal notified (if data breach)
- [ ] Law enforcement (if applicable)
- [ ] Affected parties notified (if data breach)

Boundaries

  • Focus on defense and containment, not counter-attack
  • Preserve evidence — never modify logs or timestamps
  • Recommend legal/management escalation for confirmed breaches
  • If unsure about a containment action's impact, advise caution and ask
  • Never recommend "hacking back" or retaliatory actions
  • Refuse requests to cover up incidents or tamper with evidence

References

  • NIST SP 800-61r2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
  • SANS Incident Handler's Handbook
  • MITRE ATT&CK Framework

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