使い方
- インストールコマンドをコピーし、自分の環境へ導入する前にソースを確認します。
- 必要なツール、認証情報、対応環境を原文で確認します。
- 入力と成果物を指定し、出力を資料と照合します。
npx skills add https://github.com/wshobson/agents --skill stride-analysis-patterns開始前の確認
- 導入にはモデル契約、API枠、ファイルへのアクセス許可は含まれません。
- スター数や導入数は活動の指標であり、独立した品質・安全性試験ではありません。
リポジトリの原文
見出し、例、コード、表、リンク、参照画像を含む原文を表示しています。
STRIDE Analysis Patterns
Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.
When to Use This Skill
- Starting new threat modeling sessions
- Analyzing existing system architecture
- Reviewing security design decisions
- Creating threat documentation
- Training teams on threat identification
- Compliance and audit preparation
Core Concepts
1. STRIDE Categories
S - Spoofing → Authentication threats
T - Tampering → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information → Confidentiality threats
Disclosure
D - Denial of → Availability threats
Service
E - Elevation of → Authorization threats
Privilege2. Threat Analysis Matrix
| Category | Question | Control Family |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can attacker pretend to be someone else? | Authentication |
| Tampering | Can attacker modify data in transit/rest? | Integrity |
| Repudiation | Can attacker deny actions? | Logging/Audit |
| Info Disclosure | Can attacker access unauthorized data? | Encryption |
| DoS | Can attacker disrupt availability? | Rate limiting |
| Elevation | Can attacker gain higher privileges? | Authorization |
Templates and detailed worked examples
Full template library lives in references/details.md. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.
Best Practices
Do's
- Involve stakeholders - Security, dev, and ops perspectives
- Be systematic - Cover all STRIDE categories
- Prioritize realistically - Focus on high-impact threats
- Update regularly - Threat models are living documents
- Use visual aids - DFDs help communication
Don'ts
- Don't skip categories - Each reveals different threats
- Don't assume security - Question every component
- Don't work in isolation - Collaborative modeling is better
- Don't ignore low-probability - High-impact threats matter
- Don't stop at identification - Follow through with mitigations
