사용 방법
- 설치 명령을 복사하고 자신의 에이전트 환경에 설치하기 전에 소스 패키지를 확인하세요.
- 필요한 도구, 인증 정보, 지원 환경은 원본 문서에서 확인하세요.
- 입력과 원하는 산출물을 설명하고 출처와 결과를 대조하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/baarai/artex --skill php2shell시작 전 확인
- 설치에는 모델 구독, API 한도, 파일 접근 권한이 포함되지 않습니다.
- 별점 수와 설치 수는 활동 지표이며 독립적인 품질·보안 검증이 아닙니다.
원본 저장소의 제목, 예시, 코드, 표, 링크, 이미지를 유지해 표시합니다.
php2shell: session.upload_progress LFI-to-RCE (CVE-2026-109618/109619)
Under an authorized engagement only. This skill upgrades an existing LFI/unsafe-include finding on a PHP target into RCE, or classifies the target as not affected, using the vendored PoCs under scripts/poc/php2shell/ (upstream: ikow/php2shell-poc, MIT; see the LICENSE there).
Hard gates (read before touching any target)
- Authorization: the target must be inside the task's authorized scope.
- Program policy first: many programs exclude or do not pay for
recently-patched third-party/framework zero-days within ~14 days of the patch release. PHP patched these in 8.2.35/8.3.36/8.4.27/8.5.12 (2026-10-21). CHECK the program's policy on component zero-days BEFORE testing a live target, and reflect the policy in how the finding is claimed (often "reportable, not payable" or payable only after the clause lapses).
- Detection before exploitation: fingerprint passively first (response
headers, error pages, X-Powered-By). Only targets on PHP 5.4.0-8.5.11 (any build with session.upload_progress enabled, the default) are candidates.
- Lab first: run chain 1 against the local lab (
lab/setup.shbuilds a
vulnerable PHP 8.2 FPM+nginx environment) until the mechanism is understood, then one-shot the authorized target.
- Chains 2 and 3 (var_destroy UAF, serializer mismatch) are LAB-ONLY:
never fire memory-corruption or serializer-confusion primitives at a remote target. Detection of their preconditions is fine.
- One-shot verification on the target: prove execution once (a marker
echo), capture evidence, stop. No persistence, no further exploration through the shell.
Chain 1 workflow (session file injection + LFI -> RCE)
- Start with the task's LFI finding: note the include path parameter and its
constraints (prefix/suffix, truncation, wrapper filters).
- Confirm the session path is reachable through that LFI: with
session.upload_progress.enabled=On (default), an in-flight multipart POST with an attacker-named file field writes a session file under the session save path containing the raw filename.
- Inject PHP into the uploaded filename (not the file content):
verify_session_injection.py demonstrates the full mechanics (session fixation via POST body PHPSESSID, raw filename storage, inclusion).
- Race the session file's lifetime: include it through the LFI while the
upload is still in flight (or keep the upload connection open).
- Verify RCE with a single marker command; record the request sequence as
evidence.
Detection without an LFI
The chains need an app-level file-inclusion primitive; without one the configuration is hardening-relevant, not exploitable. Report posture only.
Vendored artifacts
poc/verify_session_injection.py- chain 1 end-to-end against a lab URLpoc/verify_handler_mismatch.py- chain 3 (lab only)poc/verify_uaf_asan.php- chain 2 under an ASAN PHP build (lab only)lab/setup.sh- builds the vulnerable docker lab locallydocs/ANALYSIS.md,README.upstream.md- the upstream technical writeup