elementalsouls/claude-bughunter

hunt-clickjacking

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing).

소스 보기

사용 방법

  1. 설치 명령을 복사하고 자신의 에이전트 환경에 설치하기 전에 소스 패키지를 확인하세요.
  2. 필요한 도구, 인증 정보, 지원 환경은 원본 문서에서 확인하세요.
  3. 입력과 원하는 산출물을 설명하고 출처와 결과를 대조하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter --skill hunt-clickjacking

시작 전 확인

  • 설치에는 모델 구독, API 한도, 파일 접근 권한이 포함되지 않습니다.
  • 별점 수와 설치 수는 활동 지표이며 독립적인 품질·보안 검증이 아닙니다.
원본 Skill 문서

원본 저장소의 제목, 예시, 코드, 표, 링크, 이미지를 유지해 표시합니다.

What is Clickjacking

Clickjacking (UI Redressing) lets an attacker load a target page inside a transparent iframe on a malicious site. The victim sees the attacker's decoy UI but clicks the hidden target UI beneath it. No JavaScript on the target is required.

Highest-value targets:

  • Login / authentication pages — force login with attacker credentials
  • Money transfer / checkout / "confirm payment" buttons
  • Account settings (email change, password change, 2FA disable)
  • OAuth / social-login "Authorize app" confirmation dialogs
  • Admin actions (delete, promote user, change role)

Protection Headers

Two mechanisms prevent framing:

X-Frame-Options: DENY              # strongest — blocks all framing
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN        # allows same-origin frames only
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'     # CSP equivalent of DENY
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'     # CSP equivalent of SAMEORIGIN

If NEITHER is present, the page is frameable from any origin.

How to Test

Header-absence is the trigger for investigation, not the finding. Two steps:

Step 1 — Header check (screening). Fetch the target page and inspect the response headers:

curl -sI https://target.example/account/transfer | grep -iE 'x-frame-options|content-security-policy'

If BOTH X-Frame-Options and CSP frame-ancestors are absent, the page is a candidate. If either is present and restrictive (DENY/SAMEORIGIN/frame-ancestors 'none'|'self'), stop — it's protected.

Step 2 — Prove it actually frames and clicks (required for a real finding). Build a minimal PoC and load it in a real browser:

html
<!doctype html>
<h1>Win a prize — click below</h1>
<iframe src="https://target.example/account/transfer"
        style="opacity:0.1;position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:1000px;height:800px"></iframe>

Confirm ALL of the following, or it is not exploitable:

  • The page actually renders inside the iframe (no framebusting JS that blanks/redirects it — e.g. if(top!==self) breakout, or a Sec-Fetch-Dest/JS frame check).
  • The sensitive action still works while framed — critically, the action must succeed cross-site. If it relies on a session cookie set SameSite=Lax or SameSite=Strict (the modern default), the cookie is not sent on the cross-site framed request, and the clickjack fails. Verify the victim's authenticated state carries into the frame.
  • The target is a state-changing action (transfer, settings/email/password change, 2FA disable, OAuth authorize, admin action), not a read-only page.

Strategy: target the most sensitive action pages first — severity scales directly with what the victim is tricked into doing.

False Positives

  • Public, read-only pages (home/marketing) lacking frame protection are low/informational — no sensitive action to redress.
  • APIs and non-HTML endpoints (JSON, images) are not clickjacking targets.
  • Header-absence alone is NOT a finding. SameSite cookies, framebusting JS, or the lack of any sensitive framed action can each fully defeat it — which is why Step 2 is mandatory.

Proof Requirements

A valid clickjacking report shows: (1) the target page rendered inside an attacker-controlled iframe in a real browser, (2) a sensitive state-changing action reachable by a framed click while the victim is authenticated (cookies survive the cross-site context), and (3) a screenshot/recording of the overlay. Reporting missing headers with no working frame PoC is a documentation-quality issue, not a vulnerability.

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