사용 방법
- 설치 명령을 복사하고 자신의 에이전트 환경에 설치하기 전에 소스 패키지를 확인하세요.
- 필요한 도구, 인증 정보, 지원 환경은 원본 문서에서 확인하세요.
- 입력과 원하는 산출물을 설명하고 출처와 결과를 대조하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/mohitmishra786/low-level-dev-skills --skill kernel-security시작 전 확인
- 설치에는 모델 구독, API 한도, 파일 접근 권한이 포함되지 않습니다.
- 별점 수와 설치 수는 활동 지표이며 독립적인 품질·보안 검증이 아닙니다.
원본 Skill 문서
원본 저장소의 제목, 예시, 코드, 표, 링크, 이미지를 유지해 표시합니다.
Kernel Security
Purpose
Guide agents through Linux kernel security: LSM frameworks (SELinux, AppArmor), seccomp-bpf with libseccomp, KASLR and bypass mitigations, Intel CET (Shadow Stack + IBT), ARM PAC and BTI, kernel sanitizers (KASAN, KMSAN), and CVE triage for kernel vulnerabilities.
When to Use
- Writing SELinux or AppArmor policies for confined services
- Sandboxing processes with seccomp-bpf filters
- Hardening binaries with CET, PAC, or BTI
- Enabling KASAN on kernel builds for vulnerability research
- Triaging kernel CVE impact on your distro/kernel version
- Designing container or microservice security boundaries
Workflow
1. LSM framework overview
Application syscall
→ DAC (uid/gid, file mode)
→ LSM hook (SELinux/AppArmor/Yama/...)
→ Capability check
→ seccomp filter
→ Kernelbash
# Active LSM
cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
# common: lockdown,capability,yama,apparmor,safesetid2. SELinux policy
bash
# Check SELinux status
getenforce
sestatus
# Context of file/process
ls -Z /usr/sbin/nginx
ps -eZ | grep nginx
# Audit denials
ausearch -m avc -ts recent
sealert -a /var/log/audit/audit.logPolicy module example:
te
# myapp.te
policy_module(myapp, 1.0.0)
type myapp_t;
type myapp_exec_t;
type myapp_log_t;
init_daemon_domain(myapp_t, myapp_exec_t)
allow myapp_t myapp_log_t:file { create write append open };
allow myapp_t self:tcp_socket { create bind listen accept };bash
checkmodule -M -m -o myapp.mod myapp.te
semodule_package -o myapp.pp -m myapp.mod
semodule -i myapp.pp3. AppArmor profiles
bash
# Generate complain-mode profile
aa-genprof /usr/bin/myapp
# Enforce
aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.myapp
# Check status
aa-statusapparmor
# /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.myapp
#include <tunables/global>
/usr/bin/myapp {
#include <abstractions/base>
/usr/bin/myapp mr,
/var/log/myapp.log w,
/etc/myapp/config r,
network bind tcp,
deny /etc/shadow r,
}4. seccomp-bpf with libseccomp
c
#include <seccomp.h>
int sandbox(void) {
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS);
// Allow read/write/exit/mmap
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(read), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(write), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(exit_group), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(brk), 0);
// Return EPERM instead of kill for open
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(open), 0);
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(openat), 0);
return seccomp_load(ctx);
}bash
# Export BPF filter for audit
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = ...;
seccomp_export_bpf(ctx, fd);
# strace to find needed syscalls before tightening
strace -c ./myapp5. KASLR
bash
# Check KASLR enabled
cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space # 2 = full
dmesg | grep KASLR
# Kernel cmdline
grep kaslr /proc/cmdlineMitigations against KASLR leaks:
- No
/proc/<pid>/mapsto untrusted - Pointer hashing in
%pKprintk - eBPF restricted on unprivileged
6. Intel CET
bash
# Compile with CET
gcc -fcf-protection=full -o app app.c
# Verify shadow stack and IBT
readelf -n app | grep -E 'SHSTK|IBT'
readelf --notes app | grep -A2 GNU_PROPERTY| Feature | Protects against |
|---|---|
| SHSTK (Shadow Stack) | ROP return address overwrites |
| IBT (Indirect Branch Tracking) | CALL/JMP to non-ENDBR targets |
Requires CPU with CET (Intel Tiger Lake+; AMD Zen 3+ on CPUs with shadow-stack support) and kernel CET support.
7. ARM PAC and BTI
bash
# GCC/Clang branch protection
gcc -mbranch-protection=standard -o app app.c
# PAC (pointer authentication) + BTI (branch target identification)
# Verify
readelf -n app | grep -E 'GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1'
llvm-objdump -d app | grep btiPAC signs return addresses and pointers with cryptographic keys (ARMv8.3+). BTI marks valid branch targets — invalid jumps fault.
8. Kernel memory tagging
bash
# KASAN kernel build
# CONFIG_KASAN=y in kernel .config
make menuconfig # Kernel hacking → KASAN
# Boot with KASAN kernel
# Reports use-after-free, OOB with stack trace
# KMSAN (uninitialized memory)
# CONFIG_KMSAN=y — kernel equivalent of MSanbash
# KASAN report example fields
# BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ...
# Call trace: ...9. CVE triage workflow
bash
# Check kernel version
uname -r
# Distro security tracker
# Ubuntu: ubuntu-security-notices
# RHEL: errata
# NVD lookup
# https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-XXXX-XXXXX
# Is patch backported?
zgrep -l CVE-2024-XXXX /usr/share/doc/linux-*/changelog.Debian.gzTriage checklist:
- Affected subsystem (net, fs, drivers)?
- Local or remote exploit?
- Fixed in your kernel version?
- Mitigation without patch (disable module, sysctl)?
Common Problems
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| SELinux denials | Missing allow rule | audit2allow; refine policy |
| AppArmor profile break | Path mismatch | Update profile paths; use globs |
| seccomp kills app | Missing syscall | strace; add allow rule |
| CET not active | Old CPU/kernel | Check /proc/cpuinfo flags |
| KASAN kernel slow | 2-5x overhead | Use only in test VMs |
| False sense of security | LSM bypass via kernel bug | Defense in depth; keep kernel updated |
Related Skills
skills/virtualization/containers-internals— container seccomp and capsskills/runtimes/binary-hardening— userspace CET, RELRO, PIEskills/runtimes/sanitizers— ASan/HWASan userspace counterpartsskills/observability/ebpf— LSM BPF programsskills/kernel/kernel-debugging— analyze KASAN reportsskills/security/reverse-engineering— exploit analysis
