security-talent/bugskill-ai

stack-bounds-format-auditing

Detect, audit, and validate stack buffer overflows caused by incorrect bounds arithmetic in string formatting and memory copy operations (snprintf, swprintf, sprintf, strncpy, memcpy) writing into fixed stack buffers where the size argument is not decrement…

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Como usar

  1. Copie o comando e verifique o pacote antes de instalar no seu ambiente de agente.
  2. Consulte no original as ferramentas, credenciais e ambientes necessários.
  3. Descreva os dados de entrada e a entrega esperada; confira a saída com as fontes.
npx skills add https://github.com/security-talent/bugskill-ai --skill stack-bounds-format-auditing

Antes de começar

  • A instalação não inclui assinatura de modelo, franquia API ou acesso aos seus arquivos.
  • Estrelas e instalações indicam atividade, não um teste independente de qualidade ou segurança.
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Renderizado do repositório de origem, preservando títulos, exemplos, código, tabelas, links e imagens.

Stack-Bounds Format Auditing (C/C++)

Find, validate, and remediate stack buffer overflows in C/C++ string-formatting and serialization routines where the size argument to a bounded function is incorrect — specifically when destination pointers advance without a corresponding decrement to the remaining buffer size. Targets and codebases must be within the authorized scope of your assessment.


When to Use

  • Auditing C/C++ network protocol serializers, deserializers, and packet formatters.
  • Reviewing URL/URI generators, query-string builders, and header concatenation routines.
  • Assessing string formatting loops (snprintf, swprintf, strncpy, wcsncpy, memcpy) writing to fixed stack or heap buffers.
  • Triaging potential buffer overflows in game networking, IoT firmware, embedded systems, and IPC mechanisms.
  • Analyzing HackerOne report patterns similar to #2551512 (nn::nex::StationURL::Format on Wii U, 3DS, and Nintendo Switch NEX clients).

Reference Case: HackerOne #2551512 (Nintendo NEX StationURL::Format)

In Nintendo's NEX network library, nn::nex::StationURL::Format serializes key-value connection parameters from a std::map<String, String> into a fixed 1024-character stack buffer (wchar_t url[1024]):

cpp
// Vulnerable implementation in NEX clients (HackerOne #2551512)
void nn::nex::StationURL::Format() {
    wchar_t url[1024];
    unsigned int offset = 0;
    unsigned int written = 0;
    bool writeDelimiter = false;

    for (auto param = normalParams.begin(); param != normalParams.end(); param++) {
        if (writeDelimiter) {
            // BUG: size is always 1024 regardless of offset!
            written = swprintf(url + offset, 1024, L";");
            offset += written;
        }
        // BUG: remaining buffer space is not (1024 - offset)
        written = swprintf(url + offset, 1024, L"%ls%ls%ls",
                           param->first.c_str(), L"=", param->second.c_str());
        offset += written;
        writeDelimiter = true;
    }
    SetURL(url);
}

Root Cause Analysis

  1. swprintf(url + offset, 1024, ...) allows each iteration to write up to 1024 wide characters starting at url + offset.
  2. As offset grows, url + offset + written exceeds the 1024-element boundary (sizeof(url) = 2048 or 4096 bytes).
  3. Because StationURL strings are relayed between peer clients via Nintendo servers in multiplayer lobbies, an attacker controlling connection parameters can cause remote crashes or remote code execution (RCE) on peer consoles.

Phase 0: Recon & Codebase Scanning

  1. Locate Target String Formatting Routines:
  • Search for bounded format and copy functions: snprintf, swprintf, vsnprintf, strncpy, wcsncpy, memcpy, memmove.
  • Search for inherently unsafe unbounded functions: sprintf, vsprintf, wsprintf, strcpy, strcat, gets.
  1. Identify Cumulative Buffer Patterns:
  • Loops iterating over containers (std::vector, std::map, linked lists, arrays).
  • Pointer arithmetic or offset accumulation: buf + offset, ptr += n, dst += written.

Phase 1: Static Bounds Arithmetic Analysis

Run the bundled scanner tool across your C/C++ target source tree:

bash
# Scan a single source file or directory
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py scan --src path/to/source/

# Scan with strict filter (highlight only HIGH/CRITICAL arithmetic flaws)
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py scan --src path/to/source/ --only-suspicious

# Output machine-readable JSON for integration
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py scan --src path/to/source/ --json

Flagged Vulnerability Signatures

PatternCode ExampleRisk LevelExplanation
Static Size with Advancing Pointersnprintf(buf + off, sizeof(buf), ...)CRITICALSize argument does not subtract off. Cumulative writes overflow the buffer.
Unbounded String Functionsprintf(buf, "%s=%s", k, v)HIGHNo bounds checking whatsoever.
Incorrect Size Unit (Wide Char)swprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ...)HIGHsizeof(buf) gives byte count instead of wide character count (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(wchar_t)).
Underflow via Negationsnprintf(buf + off, sizeof(buf) - off, ...)MEDIUMIf off > sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf) - off wraps to huge unsigned integer if types are mismatched.

Phase 2: PoC Harness Generation & Crash Validation

Generate and execute a standalone reproduction harness to prove stack overflow and memory corruption:

bash
# Generate the C/C++ reproduction PoC
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py harness --out poc_stationurl.c

# Build and run the PoC with AddressSanitizer (ASan) / stack protector
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py harness --build --run

# Test char / snprintf (narrow character) variant
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py harness --narrow --build --run

# Compile the verified safe fix (-DSAFE) to prove remediation
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py harness --safe --build --run

Phase 3: Automation Tooling (fmt_bounds_audit.py)

The bundled standalone utility `scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py` provides zero-dependency C/C++ code auditing:

  • scan: Regex-based static analysis engine tailored for format-string bounds errors and pointer arithmetic bugs.
  • harness: Self-contained PoC generator simulating multi-parameter serialization overflow.
  • demo: Exports the exact vulnerable Nintendo NEX StationURL::Format sample code for verification and benchmarking.
bash
# Write demo sample and test scanner
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py demo --out stationurl_sample.cpp
python3 scripts/fmt_bounds_audit.py scan --src stationurl_sample.cpp

Phase 4: Exploitability & Impact Assessment

  • Denial of Service (Crash): Overwriting the return address or stack canary triggers immediate process termination (SIGSEGV or __stack_chk_fail).
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): In environments lacking stack canaries or with controllable stack layout, an attacker can overwrite return pointers or function pointers on the stack to hijack control flow.
  • Peer-to-Peer Relay Attack Vector: When formatted strings are exchanged through matchmaking servers, untrusted inputs from one client compromise remote peer clients.

CVSS 3.1 & CWE Mapping

  • CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
  • CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
  • CWE-676: Use of Potentially Dangerous Function
  • CVSS:3.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (Base Score: 9.8 Critical for remote network services / peer relays; 7.5 High for local crashes)

Remediation Checklist & Secure Patterns

  • [ ] Subtract Current Offset from Remaining Capacity:
cpp
  // Secure bounds arithmetic
  if (offset < sizeof(url)/sizeof(url[0])) {
      size_t remaining = (sizeof(url)/sizeof(url[0])) - offset;
      int written = swprintf(url + offset, remaining, L"%ls=%ls", key, val);
      if (written > 0 && (size_t)written < remaining) {
          offset += written;
      }
  }
  • [ ] Use Dynamic String Containers in Modern C++:
cpp
  // Recommended modern C++ pattern using std::wstring / std::stringstream
  std::wstring url;
  for (const auto& [key, val] : normalParams) {
      if (!url.empty()) url += L";";
      url += key + L"=" + val;
  }
  SetURL(url.c_str());
  • [ ] Check snprintf / swprintf Return Values for Truncation:
  • In C99/C++11, snprintf returns the number of characters that would have been written if buffer was large enough. Always check if (written >= remaining) to detect truncation and prevent offset inflation.
  • [ ] Enable Compiler Hardening:
  • Compile with -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, -fstack-protector-strong, and -fsanitize=address,undefined.
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