elementalsouls/claude-bughunter

hunt-shadow-api

Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper Inventory Management) — enumerate the full API version history (v1/v2/beta/legacy paths, header- and subdomain-based versioning), pull and diff every reachable OpenAPI/Swagger spec (includ…

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npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter --skill hunt-shadow-api

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OWASP API9 — Improper Inventory Management (Shadow / Zombie APIs)

As an API evolves, old versions and internal/staging routes routinely stay reachable without receiving the same security fixes as the current version — because nobody tracks that they still exist. The bug is rarely in one endpoint; it's in the delta between what an old version enforces and what the current version enforces on the same operation.

When to use

Trigger when:

  • Versioned paths are visible (/v1/, /v2/, /api/2023-01-01/) or Accept/X-API-Version

headers are in play.

  • A changelog, release notes, or deprecation notice references removed/old API behavior.
  • A mobile APK/IPA (via apk-redteam-pipeline / ios-redteam-pipeline) hardcodes endpoints

that look like an older backend version than the current web app calls.

  • Multiple OpenAPI/Swagger specs are discoverable, or info.version in one spec implies others

exist.

DO NOT use for single-version APIs with no version history — there's nothing to diff; go straight to hunt-api-misconfig for direct exploitation of the one surface that exists.


Stage 1 — Enumerate the Full Version Surface

bash
# Path-based versioning
for v in v1 v2 v3 v4 beta alpha internal legacy old 2022-01-01 2023-01-01 2024-01-01; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} /api/$v/\n" "https://$TARGET/api/$v/"
done

# Header-based versioning
curl -s -H "X-API-Version: 1" https://$TARGET/api/users
curl -s -H "Accept: application/vnd.company.v1+json" https://$TARGET/api/users

# Subdomain-based versioning
for sub in api api-v1 api-v2 apiv1 apiv2 legacy-api old-api internal-api staging-api; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $sub\n" "https://$sub.$TARGET/"
done

A 200/401/403 on an old version path (anything but 404/connection-refused) means the version is still live and worth carrying into Stage 3, even if it demands auth.


Stage 2 — Pull Every Reachable Spec, Not Just the Linked One

bash
for path in openapi.json swagger.json v1/swagger.json v2/swagger.json v3/api-docs \
            api-docs.json swagger/v1/swagger.json .well-known/openapi.json; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} /$path\n" "https://$TARGET/$path"
done

# Wayback Machine — a DEPRECATED version's spec often stays indexed after the live link is removed
curl -s "http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$TARGET/*swagger*&output=json&collapse=urlkey"
curl -s "http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$TARGET/*openapi*&output=json&collapse=urlkey"

When more than one spec resolves (a current one and an archived/old one), diff the endpoint inventories directly:

bash
jq -r '.paths | keys[]' v1-swagger.json | sort > /tmp/v1_paths.txt
jq -r '.paths | keys[]' v2-swagger.json | sort > /tmp/v2_paths.txt
comm -23 /tmp/v1_paths.txt /tmp/v2_paths.txt   # in v1 only — candidates for "still live but forgotten"

For every path in that diff, confirm it's still reachable against the v1 base URL. A route documented only in the old spec that still returns something other than 404 is a zombie- endpoint candidate — carry it into Stage 3.


Stage 3 — Behavioral Diff Between Old and Current Version

For each operation that exists in both versions, compare security-relevant behavior, not response shape. Response shape differences are Informational; behavioral security regressions are the finding.

  • Auth strength. Does the old version accept no token, an expired token, or a lower-

privilege token that the current version rejects?

bash
  curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" https://$TARGET/api/v1/users/me -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
  curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" https://$TARGET/api/v2/users/me -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
  • Rate limiting. Burst the same number of requests against both versions' equivalent

endpoint; a missing 429 on the old version means rate-limiting was added later and never backported.

  • Input validation. Send the identical injection/oversized/malformed payload to both; the

old version accepting what the new one rejects means hardening happened forward-only — chain into whichever injection class the payload targets (hunt-sqli, hunt-idor, etc.).

  • Field exposure. Does the old version's response body include fields — internal IDs, other

users' data, internal notes, PII — that the current version has since redacted?


Stage 4 — Deprecated / Internal Routes Never Referenced by the Current UI

  • Grep JS bundles for API calls no visible UI flow triggers (/internal/, /admin/, /debug/,

/_internal/, /test/, /staging/) — reuse hunt-source-leak's JS-bundle grep patterns for this specifically.

  • Check robots.txt / sitemap.xml for disallowed API paths — a self-inflicted disclosure.
  • Mobile-app endpoint inventories (via apk-redteam-pipeline / ios-redteam-pipeline) very

often reference an older backend version than the current web app calls. Treat every APK/IPA-sourced endpoint as a version-diff candidate against the live web API.


False-Positive Gate

  • A version difference alone (different response shape, cosmetic field renaming) is

Informational. The finding is a security-relevant regression — auth, rate-limit, or validation that got weaker going backward in version history.

  • Confirm the old endpoint is not simply an alias/proxy to the current implementation before

claiming a behavioral difference — send a payload that would actually behave differently under old vs. new logic, not just compare a version string in the response body.

  • A 200 on a path that just serves a static "this API version is deprecated, use v2" message

is not a finding — confirm the underlying operation still executes.


Severity Table

FindingSeverity
Old version bypasses auth entirely where current version requires itCritical
Old version missing rate-limit present on current versionMedium–High (chain via hunt-brute-force)
Old version leaks extra fields (PII, internal IDs) vs. currentMedium–High
Old version accepts payloads the current version now validates/sanitizesHigh (chain to the underlying injection class)
Version is reachable but behaviorally identical to currentInformational

Related Skills & Chains

  • `hunt-api-misconfig` — owns exploitation once a spec or endpoint is in hand (mass

assignment, JWT attacks, OData, Swagger-chain attacks). This skill hands it a sharper target: "here's a zombie endpoint with weaker validation than the current one."

  • `hunt-subdomain` — owns host/subdomain-level discovery (api-v1.target.com as its own

host, potential takeover). This skill owns what happens once you're inside a given host's version surface.

  • `hunt-source-leak` — JS-bundle grep for internal/undocumented calls; reused here

specifically for version-diffing rather than secret extraction.

  • `apk-redteam-pipeline` / `ios-redteam-pipeline` — mobile builds routinely hardcode an

older API version; every mobile-sourced endpoint is a version-diff candidate.

  • `hunt-brute-force` — a rate-limit regression found here is only a complete finding once

chained to actual brute-forceable impact (login, OTP, enumeration).

관련 작업

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