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OWASP API9 — Improper Inventory Management (Shadow / Zombie APIs)
As an API evolves, old versions and internal/staging routes routinely stay reachable without receiving the same security fixes as the current version — because nobody tracks that they still exist. The bug is rarely in one endpoint; it's in the delta between what an old version enforces and what the current version enforces on the same operation.
When to use
Trigger when:
- Versioned paths are visible (
/v1/,/v2/,/api/2023-01-01/) orAccept/X-API-Version
headers are in play.
- A changelog, release notes, or deprecation notice references removed/old API behavior.
- A mobile APK/IPA (via
apk-redteam-pipeline/ios-redteam-pipeline) hardcodes endpoints
that look like an older backend version than the current web app calls.
- Multiple OpenAPI/Swagger specs are discoverable, or
info.versionin one spec implies others
exist.
DO NOT use for single-version APIs with no version history — there's nothing to diff; go straight to hunt-api-misconfig for direct exploitation of the one surface that exists.
Stage 1 — Enumerate the Full Version Surface
# Path-based versioning
for v in v1 v2 v3 v4 beta alpha internal legacy old 2022-01-01 2023-01-01 2024-01-01; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} /api/$v/\n" "https://$TARGET/api/$v/"
done
# Header-based versioning
curl -s -H "X-API-Version: 1" https://$TARGET/api/users
curl -s -H "Accept: application/vnd.company.v1+json" https://$TARGET/api/users
# Subdomain-based versioning
for sub in api api-v1 api-v2 apiv1 apiv2 legacy-api old-api internal-api staging-api; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $sub\n" "https://$sub.$TARGET/"
doneA 200/401/403 on an old version path (anything but 404/connection-refused) means the version is still live and worth carrying into Stage 3, even if it demands auth.
Stage 2 — Pull Every Reachable Spec, Not Just the Linked One
for path in openapi.json swagger.json v1/swagger.json v2/swagger.json v3/api-docs \
api-docs.json swagger/v1/swagger.json .well-known/openapi.json; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} /$path\n" "https://$TARGET/$path"
done
# Wayback Machine — a DEPRECATED version's spec often stays indexed after the live link is removed
curl -s "http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$TARGET/*swagger*&output=json&collapse=urlkey"
curl -s "http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$TARGET/*openapi*&output=json&collapse=urlkey"When more than one spec resolves (a current one and an archived/old one), diff the endpoint inventories directly:
jq -r '.paths | keys[]' v1-swagger.json | sort > /tmp/v1_paths.txt
jq -r '.paths | keys[]' v2-swagger.json | sort > /tmp/v2_paths.txt
comm -23 /tmp/v1_paths.txt /tmp/v2_paths.txt # in v1 only — candidates for "still live but forgotten"For every path in that diff, confirm it's still reachable against the v1 base URL. A route documented only in the old spec that still returns something other than 404 is a zombie- endpoint candidate — carry it into Stage 3.
Stage 3 — Behavioral Diff Between Old and Current Version
For each operation that exists in both versions, compare security-relevant behavior, not response shape. Response shape differences are Informational; behavioral security regressions are the finding.
- Auth strength. Does the old version accept no token, an expired token, or a lower-
privilege token that the current version rejects?
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" https://$TARGET/api/v1/users/me -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" https://$TARGET/api/v2/users/me -w '\n%{http_code}\n'- Rate limiting. Burst the same number of requests against both versions' equivalent
endpoint; a missing 429 on the old version means rate-limiting was added later and never backported.
- Input validation. Send the identical injection/oversized/malformed payload to both; the
old version accepting what the new one rejects means hardening happened forward-only — chain into whichever injection class the payload targets (hunt-sqli, hunt-idor, etc.).
- Field exposure. Does the old version's response body include fields — internal IDs, other
users' data, internal notes, PII — that the current version has since redacted?
Stage 4 — Deprecated / Internal Routes Never Referenced by the Current UI
- Grep JS bundles for API calls no visible UI flow triggers (
/internal/,/admin/,/debug/,
/_internal/, /test/, /staging/) — reuse hunt-source-leak's JS-bundle grep patterns for this specifically.
- Check
robots.txt/sitemap.xmlfor disallowed API paths — a self-inflicted disclosure. - Mobile-app endpoint inventories (via
apk-redteam-pipeline/ios-redteam-pipeline) very
often reference an older backend version than the current web app calls. Treat every APK/IPA-sourced endpoint as a version-diff candidate against the live web API.
False-Positive Gate
- A version difference alone (different response shape, cosmetic field renaming) is
Informational. The finding is a security-relevant regression — auth, rate-limit, or validation that got weaker going backward in version history.
- Confirm the old endpoint is not simply an alias/proxy to the current implementation before
claiming a behavioral difference — send a payload that would actually behave differently under old vs. new logic, not just compare a version string in the response body.
- A
200on a path that just serves a static "this API version is deprecated, use v2" message
is not a finding — confirm the underlying operation still executes.
Severity Table
| Finding | Severity |
|---|---|
| Old version bypasses auth entirely where current version requires it | Critical |
| Old version missing rate-limit present on current version | Medium–High (chain via hunt-brute-force) |
| Old version leaks extra fields (PII, internal IDs) vs. current | Medium–High |
| Old version accepts payloads the current version now validates/sanitizes | High (chain to the underlying injection class) |
| Version is reachable but behaviorally identical to current | Informational |
Related Skills & Chains
- `hunt-api-misconfig` — owns exploitation once a spec or endpoint is in hand (mass
assignment, JWT attacks, OData, Swagger-chain attacks). This skill hands it a sharper target: "here's a zombie endpoint with weaker validation than the current one."
- `hunt-subdomain` — owns host/subdomain-level discovery (
api-v1.target.comas its own
host, potential takeover). This skill owns what happens once you're inside a given host's version surface.
- `hunt-source-leak` — JS-bundle grep for internal/undocumented calls; reused here
specifically for version-diffing rather than secret extraction.
- `apk-redteam-pipeline` / `ios-redteam-pipeline` — mobile builds routinely hardcode an
older API version; every mobile-sourced endpoint is a version-diff candidate.
- `hunt-brute-force` — a rate-limit regression found here is only a complete finding once
chained to actual brute-forceable impact (login, OTP, enumeration).

