elementalsouls/claude-bughunter

recon-scope-triage

Triage ASM/recon output for ownership before testing — separate the target's real assets from namespace-collision noise.

소스 보기

사용 방법

  1. 설치 명령을 복사하고 자신의 에이전트 환경에 설치하기 전에 소스 패키지를 확인하세요.
  2. 필요한 도구, 인증 정보, 지원 환경은 원본 문서에서 확인하세요.
  3. 입력과 원하는 산출물을 설명하고 출처와 결과를 대조하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter --skill recon-scope-triage

시작 전 확인

  • 설치에는 모델 구독, API 한도, 파일 접근 권한이 포함되지 않습니다.
  • 별점 수와 설치 수는 활동 지표이며 독립적인 품질·보안 검증이 아닙니다.
원본 Skill 문서

원본 저장소의 제목, 예시, 코드, 표, 링크, 이미지를 유지해 표시합니다.

When to use this skill

Trigger when:

  • The target brand is a common/dictionary word or shared term (e.g. apex, summit, vertex, nova, core, orbit, pulse, unity…)
  • You receive an ASM report, recon export, breach combo, repo list, bucket list, or mobile-app list to act on
  • A "Critical" count looks implausibly high (hundreds) for the org's size
  • Any asset's ownership is asserted by the tool but not proven

The two failure modes this skill prevents:

  1. Wasting the engagement testing/triaging assets that aren't the target's.
  2. Attacking an innocent third party that merely shares the name — out of scope, and real harm.

Rule: ownership is guilty-until-proven. An asset is the target's only when a concrete ownership signal ties it to the target — never because a scanner's keyword matched.


The collision sources (where keyword-matching lies)

Recon sourceHow it collidesVerify ownership by
GitHub reposSearch matched the brand word in repo name / topic / a stringRepo owner is the org's GH org; commits from org emails; code references the org's real domains/infra. A repo named <word>-backend by a random user = noise.
Cloud buckets (S3/GCS)Bucket names are a global namespace; <word>-static, <word>-data, <word>-public exist for someoneBucket content references the target; bucket name correlates with a confirmed target subdomain (x.target.com ↔ x-public) AND content matches; ACL/owner metadata. Generic content (other-language, other-industry) = not theirs.
Mobile appsStore search matched the brand word in app name / packagePublisher account = the org; package reverse-DNS = an owned domain (com.<owneddomain>.app); dev cert; app calls owned API hosts. Mature ASM tools emit an "apps_accepted=0" / ownership-confidence field — read it.
Breach corpora / combosEmail local-or-domain contains the brand wordExact owned-domain match only (@target.com), not @<word>group.com / @something<word>.com. A different domain that contains the word is a different org.
TyposquatsGenerated permutations of the nameThese are defensive/brand-protection findings, not offensive scope — note and move on.
Stack/forum/paste hitsBrand word in bodyBody references the target's real domain/subdomain/employee/secret. Ownership-confidence < threshold = drop.

Web "Critical" triage — the soft-404 control

Automated .env / .git / actuator / admin-panel "Criticals" are overwhelmingly soft-404s: SPA/framework catch-alls returning HTTP 200 (or 403) for every path. Verify EACH before believing it:

bash
# the "finding"
curl -s -o /tmp/a -w "%{http_code} %{size_download}\n" https://host.target.com/.env
# a junk control on the same host
curl -s -o /tmp/b -w "%{http_code} %{size_download}\n" https://host.target.com/zzz-nonsense-$RANDOM
# identical byte length / body  →  FALSE POSITIVE (catch-all), discard
cmp -s /tmp/a /tmp/b && echo "SOFT-404 false positive" || echo "differs — investigate"

Real exposures have a content-type + signature that differs from the catch-all (.git/config starts [core]; .env has KEY=value; phpinfo has the XHTML-transitional doctype + PHP Version). A physical .php/phpinfo.php that returns a bigger/different body than the junk control is the real-vs-soft-404 tell.


The triage workflow

  1. Confirm the canonical owned-domain set first (the SOW/program domain + its verified subdomains + the verified Entra/Okta/Google tenant brand name). This is your ownership anchor.
  2. For each asset class, apply the verify-by column above. No signal → quarantine, don't test.
  3. Re-baseline the severity counts against only-owned assets. Report the delta — "N Criticals → M after ownership + soft-404 triage" is itself a finding about the ASM program.
  4. Quarantine collisions explicitly (a loot/quarantined_<source>.txt) so it's auditable that you saw them and chose not to target them.
  5. Surface the meta-finding: if the supplied ASM/recon feed is mostly false-positive, that misallocates the owner's remediation budget and buries real risk — write it up (Medium/Strategic).

Anti-patterns

  • Trusting the tool's "owned" label. Tools keyword-match; they don't prove ownership. Verify.
  • Targeting a same-named third party because it was "in the report." Out of scope + real harm. A combo line user@<word>company.com is a different company's employee.
  • Reporting soft-404s as exposures. Always run the junk-path control.
  • Counting typosquats / missing-headers / brand-collision repos as offensive findings. They're defensive/hygiene/noise — they pad the report and erode credibility.
  • Skipping triage "to save time." Untriaged, you spend the whole engagement on other people's assets and find nothing real.

Why this matters (calibration)

For a target whose brand is a common word, expect the bulk of automated "owned" assets to be collisions:

  • Repos that are unrelated open-source projects (ad-block lists, scrapers, student projects, a different company's SDK) merely containing the word.
  • Mobile apps published by entirely different companies that share the name — banks, credit unions, dating apps, dispensaries, home-care services are all real-world collision categories. (Good ASM tooling will tell you it accepted zero as owned.)
  • Cloud buckets in the global namespace holding some unrelated org's content (other-language documents, demo/sample data, another industry's files).
  • Breach combos full of emails from sibling-named-but-different companies (<word>group.com, <region><word>.com).

On a real engagement against a dictionary-word brand, after clearing this noise the only genuinely-owned high-severity finding was discoverable solely by manual tradecraft (a JS-bundle → API discovery, see hunt-spa-api) — it was nowhere in the hundreds of scanner "Criticals." Triage-first is what made the engagement productive instead of a goose chase.


Related Skills & Chains

  • `triage-validation` — asset-ownership triage (this skill) precedes finding-validity triage (the 7-Question Gate). Ownership first, then validity.
  • `redteam-mindset` — "aggressive default" means probe every owned live surface; this skill defines which surfaces are owned so persistence isn't wasted on collisions.
  • `hunt-spa-api` — once an API host passes ownership triage, this is how you test it.
  • `offensive-osint` / `osint-methodology` — feed ownership anchors (verified domains, tenant brand, dev accounts) from OSINT into this triage.

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