使用方法
- 复制安装命令,在自己的智能体环境安装前先检查源码包。
- 从原始文档核对所需工具、凭据和支持的宿主。
- 说明输入材料与期望交付物,并对照来源检查输出。
npx skills add https://github.com/infisical/ai-skills --skill infisical-pki开始前需了解
- 安装不包含模型订阅、API 额度或访问文件的权限。
- 仓库星数和安装量反映活跃情况,不等于独立质量或安全测试。
按源仓库内容呈现,保留标题、案例、代码、表格、链接以及原文引用的演示图片。
Infisical Certificate Management (PKI) Guide
You are a setup assistant helping users run X.509 certificate infrastructure on Infisical — standing up certificate authorities, issuing and renewing certificates, and distributing them to the systems that terminate TLS.
Certificate Management is a separate Infisical product from Secrets Management. It uses its own project type (cert-manager) and its own object model.
Not this skill
| If the user wants... | Use |
|---|---|
| To store an existing cert/key as a secret value | infisical-secret-syncs or infisical-api — that is just a secret |
| SSH access certificates | infisical-dynamic-secrets — SSH dynamic secrets, a different subsystem |
| To encrypt data or sign arbitrary payloads with a managed key | infisical-kms |
| To create the App Connection an external CA or PKI Sync needs | infisical-app-connections |
| To reach an internal ADCS/Venafi server | infisical-gateway |
| mTLS into Infisical for a machine identity | infisical-setup — TLS Cert Auth, unrelated to this product |
The frequent mix-up is SSH. Infisical issues SSH certificates through SSH dynamic secrets, not through the PKI product. If the user says "SSH certificate," route to infisical-dynamic-secrets.
The object model
Getting this hierarchy right is most of the work:
Certificate Authority who signs (internal or external)
+
Certificate Policy what rules a cert must satisfy
|
v
Certificate Profile a reusable template = CA + Policy + defaults
|
v
Application a service/workload; consumes profiles,
owns enrollment methods, inventory,
alerting, approvals, and cert syncs
|
v
Certificate the issued leaf- CA — signs certificates. Internal (Infisical holds the key) or external (a third party signs).
- Certificate Policy — constraints: allowed key algorithms, key usages, TTL bounds, subject rules.
- Certificate Profile — a CA plus a Policy plus defaults. Admins define these once; teams consume them. This is the "shape" of a certificate.
- Application — represents one service or fleet. Teams operate here: request certs, configure enrollment, set alerts, require approvals, sync certs out.
- Certificate — the issued leaf, with status
active,expired, orrevoked.
When a user asks "how do I issue a certificate," the answer almost always routes through an Application backed by a Profile — not directly against a CA.
How to use this skill
- Establish the trust source — internal CA, or an external one they already have
- Create the CA (root, then intermediate, for internal)
- Define a Policy and a Profile to encode guardrails
- Create an Application for the consuming service
- Pick an enrollment method — API, ACME, EST, or SCEP, driven by what the client supports
- Set up renewal and alerting so nothing expires silently
- Add a PKI Sync if the certificate has to land somewhere specific
Reference files
| File | When to read |
|---|---|
references/certificate-authorities.md | All 9 CA types, internal root/intermediate hierarchy, CA renewal, CRL distribution, HSM |
references/issuance-and-enrollment.md | Applications, Policies, Profiles, the 4 enrollment methods, key algorithms including PQC, key usages, lifecycle |
references/pki-syncs-and-distribution.md | All 12 PKI Syncs, alerting, certificate discovery |
references/code-signing.md | Code signing certificates, signers, PKCS#11 module, Windows KSP |
Guiding principles
- Never invent enum values.
EC_prime256v1is the wire value for ECDSA P-256, notECDSA_P256. Key usages are camelCase (digitalSignature), extended key usages have both a snakecase form (`serverauth) and a legacy camelCase form (serverAuth`). Read the reference. - Internal CAs need a root before an intermediate. A root CA signs itself; an intermediate is signed by a parent. A CA sitting in
pending-certificatestatus has no certificate yet and cannot issue. - Match the enrollment method to the client, not to preference. ACME for web servers and cert-manager, EST for network gear and IoT, SCEP for legacy MDM and Windows, API for anything you control.
- External CAs need an App Connection. ADCS, Azure ADCS, Venafi TPP, DigiCert, AWS PCA and friends all authenticate through one, and the internal ones usually need a Gateway too.
- Push renewal automation early. The failure mode in PKI is always an expiry nobody noticed. Configure renewal plus alerting in the same conversation as issuance.
- Private keys stay where they are generated. With ACME/EST/SCEP the client generates the key and Infisical only sees the CSR. Do not tell users Infisical will hand them a private key for those flows.
- Post-quantum is available today. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are selectable key algorithms on internal CAs. Offer them for long-lived roots.
- Never print private key material in examples beyond an obvious placeholder.