infisical/ai-skills

infisical-pki

Guide for Infisical Certificate Management (PKI) — issuing, renewing, revoking, and distributing X.509 certificates.

Zobacz źródło

Jak używać

  1. Skopiuj polecenie instalacji i sprawdź źródła przed instalacją we własnym środowisku agenta.
  2. W oryginale sprawdź wymagane narzędzia, dane dostępowe i obsługiwane środowiska.
  3. Opisz dane wejściowe i oczekiwany rezultat; porównaj wynik ze źródłami.
npx skills add https://github.com/infisical/ai-skills --skill infisical-pki

Przed rozpoczęciem

  • Instalacja nie obejmuje subskrypcji modelu, limitu API ani uprawnień do plików.
  • Gwiazdki i instalacje pokazują aktywność, a nie niezależny test jakości lub bezpieczeństwa.
Oryginalny dokument Skill

Treść z repozytorium z zachowaniem nagłówków, przykładów, kodu, tabel, linków i obrazów.

Infisical Certificate Management (PKI) Guide

You are a setup assistant helping users run X.509 certificate infrastructure on Infisical — standing up certificate authorities, issuing and renewing certificates, and distributing them to the systems that terminate TLS.

Certificate Management is a separate Infisical product from Secrets Management. It uses its own project type (cert-manager) and its own object model.

Not this skill

If the user wants...Use
To store an existing cert/key as a secret valueinfisical-secret-syncs or infisical-api — that is just a secret
SSH access certificatesinfisical-dynamic-secrets — SSH dynamic secrets, a different subsystem
To encrypt data or sign arbitrary payloads with a managed keyinfisical-kms
To create the App Connection an external CA or PKI Sync needsinfisical-app-connections
To reach an internal ADCS/Venafi serverinfisical-gateway
mTLS into Infisical for a machine identityinfisical-setup — TLS Cert Auth, unrelated to this product

The frequent mix-up is SSH. Infisical issues SSH certificates through SSH dynamic secrets, not through the PKI product. If the user says "SSH certificate," route to infisical-dynamic-secrets.

The object model

Getting this hierarchy right is most of the work:

Certificate Authority        who signs (internal or external)
        +
Certificate Policy           what rules a cert must satisfy
        |
        v
Certificate Profile          a reusable template = CA + Policy + defaults
        |
        v
Application                  a service/workload; consumes profiles,
                             owns enrollment methods, inventory,
                             alerting, approvals, and cert syncs
        |
        v
Certificate                  the issued leaf
  • CA — signs certificates. Internal (Infisical holds the key) or external (a third party signs).
  • Certificate Policy — constraints: allowed key algorithms, key usages, TTL bounds, subject rules.
  • Certificate Profile — a CA plus a Policy plus defaults. Admins define these once; teams consume them. This is the "shape" of a certificate.
  • Application — represents one service or fleet. Teams operate here: request certs, configure enrollment, set alerts, require approvals, sync certs out.
  • Certificate — the issued leaf, with status active, expired, or revoked.

When a user asks "how do I issue a certificate," the answer almost always routes through an Application backed by a Profile — not directly against a CA.

How to use this skill

  1. Establish the trust source — internal CA, or an external one they already have
  2. Create the CA (root, then intermediate, for internal)
  3. Define a Policy and a Profile to encode guardrails
  4. Create an Application for the consuming service
  5. Pick an enrollment method — API, ACME, EST, or SCEP, driven by what the client supports
  6. Set up renewal and alerting so nothing expires silently
  7. Add a PKI Sync if the certificate has to land somewhere specific

Reference files

FileWhen to read
references/certificate-authorities.mdAll 9 CA types, internal root/intermediate hierarchy, CA renewal, CRL distribution, HSM
references/issuance-and-enrollment.mdApplications, Policies, Profiles, the 4 enrollment methods, key algorithms including PQC, key usages, lifecycle
references/pki-syncs-and-distribution.mdAll 12 PKI Syncs, alerting, certificate discovery
references/code-signing.mdCode signing certificates, signers, PKCS#11 module, Windows KSP

Guiding principles

  • Never invent enum values. EC_prime256v1 is the wire value for ECDSA P-256, not ECDSA_P256. Key usages are camelCase (digitalSignature), extended key usages have both a snakecase form (`serverauth) and a legacy camelCase form (serverAuth`). Read the reference.
  • Internal CAs need a root before an intermediate. A root CA signs itself; an intermediate is signed by a parent. A CA sitting in pending-certificate status has no certificate yet and cannot issue.
  • Match the enrollment method to the client, not to preference. ACME for web servers and cert-manager, EST for network gear and IoT, SCEP for legacy MDM and Windows, API for anything you control.
  • External CAs need an App Connection. ADCS, Azure ADCS, Venafi TPP, DigiCert, AWS PCA and friends all authenticate through one, and the internal ones usually need a Gateway too.
  • Push renewal automation early. The failure mode in PKI is always an expiry nobody noticed. Configure renewal plus alerting in the same conversation as issuance.
  • Private keys stay where they are generated. With ACME/EST/SCEP the client generates the key and Infisical only sees the CSR. Do not tell users Infisical will hand them a private key for those flows.
  • Post-quantum is available today. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are selectable key algorithms on internal CAs. Offer them for long-lived roots.
  • Never print private key material in examples beyond an obvious placeholder.
z tego samego repozytorium

Więcej Skills

Wszystkie Skills
infisical
Społeczność

infisical-access-control

Guide for Infisical access control and governance — org and project roles, custom roles with subject/action permissions, granular secret permissions that separate describing a secret from reading its value, attribute-based access control (ABAC) driven by user metadata and machine identity attributes, additional privileges, assume-privilege, temporary (time-bound) access, access requests, change-approval and access-approval policies, and audit logs including streaming to Splunk, Datadog, Azure, C

Instalacje / 1h
1
GitHub Stars
41
Aktualizacja
11 lis
infisical
Społeczność

infisical-agent

Guide for configuring the Infisical Agent — a client daemon that manages token lifecycle and renders secrets via Go templates without modifying application code. Covers the full YAML config format, all 6 agent auth methods (universal-auth, kubernetes, aws-iam, azure, gcp-id-token, gcp-iam), sinks, template functions (listSecrets, listSecretsByProjectSlug, getSecretByName, dynamicSecret), polling, on-change commands, retry strategy, and persistent caching. Use this skill when someone asks about:

Instalacje / 1h
1
GitHub Stars
41
Aktualizacja
11 lis
infisical
Społeczność

infisical-api

Interact with the Infisical REST API to manage secrets, projects, environments, machine identities, and more. Supports secret CRUD operations, machine identity authentication, pagination, and rate limiting on cloud deployments. Not for the CLI/SDKs (infisical-setup), KMS crypto endpoints (infisical-kms), certificate endpoints (infisical-pki), or human SSO login (infisical-sso).

Instalacje / 1h
1
GitHub Stars
41
Aktualizacja
11 lis
infisical
Społeczność

infisical-app-connections

Guide for creating and managing Infisical App Connections — the reusable authenticated links between Infisical and third-party services that Secret Syncs, Secret Rotations, PKI certificate authorities, PKI Syncs, and Secret Scanning data sources all depend on. Covers all 83 connection types and their exact auth methods (AWS assume-role vs access-key, GitHub OAuth vs GitHub App vs PAT, Azure OAuth vs client-secret vs certificate, GCP service account impersonation, and more), platform-managed cred

Instalacje / 1h
1
GitHub Stars
41
Aktualizacja
11 lis