mfa-on-mobile

MFA on Mobile

Instructions

MFA on mobile covers both the app as the authenticator (TOTP / push) and the app as the user (consuming a second factor during login).

1. Factor Types

2. TOTP as an Authenticator App

• Use the standard RFC 6238 with SHA-1 or SHA-256, 6 digits, 30-second period for maximum compatibility. Document any deviation.
• Store the shared secret only in Keystore / Keychain, wrapped by a biometric-gated key.
• Never back up TOTP secrets to iCloud / Google Drive in plaintext.

fun generateTotp(secret: ByteArray, time: Long = System.currentTimeMillis()): String {
    val counter = ByteBuffer.allocate(8).putLong(time / 1000 / 30).array()
    val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA1").apply { init(SecretKeySpec(secret, "HmacSHA1")) }
    val hash = mac.doFinal(counter)
    val offset = hash.last().toInt() and 0x0f
    val bin = ((hash[offset].toInt() and 0x7f) shl 24) or
              ((hash[offset + 1].toInt() and 0xff) shl 16) or
              ((hash[offset + 2].toInt() and 0xff) shl 8) or
               (hash[offset + 3].toInt() and 0xff)
    return "%06d".format(bin % 1_000_000)
}

3. Push-Based MFA (Done Right)

Push MFA is a signing operation, not a boolean tap:

1. Server sends a push with a challenge_id — not an "approve / deny" payload alone.
2. App fetches the challenge detail (amount, merchant, IP, location) over an authenticated channel.
3. User reviews human-readable context and confirms.
4. App signs challenge_id || context_hash with a biometric-gated Keystore key.
5. Server verifies the signature against the registered device public key.

Never auto-approve. Never accept a push whose contents you didn't fetch over HTTPS from the server.

4. Preventing MFA Fatigue

• Require number matching (user types a 2-digit code shown on the origin device).
• Throttle push requests server-side; after N rapid prompts, fall back to a stronger factor.
• Log and surface unusual prompts (new country, new device) in an in-app audit log.

5. Consuming MFA During Login

If your app is an OAuth client:

• Prefer acr_values / amr claims in the id_token so the server tells you what factors were used.
• Support the browser flow's step-up — do not re-implement the challenge in the native app.
• On step-up failure, clearly distinguish "wrong code" from "account locked".

6. Recovery UX

Recovery is where MFA projects usually fail:

• Provide backup codes at enrollment (one-time, downloadable, printable). Store the hash server-side.
• Support FIDO2 security keys as a non-lose-your-phone recovery option when feasible.
• Document an account-recovery flow that is slower and more verified than normal login (identity check, cooling-off period).
• Never allow "email a reset link" to fully bypass MFA on high-value accounts.

7. Platform APIs

• iOS: ASAuthorizationController + ASAuthorizationPlatformPublicKeyCredentialProvider for passkeys.
• Android: CredentialManager for passkeys / saved passwords.
• Flutter: credential_manager package.
• React Native: react-native-passkey.

Passkeys are strictly better than TOTP for most apps; ship them where the user base has device support.

Checklist

• [ ] SMS is not the only second factor offered on high-value accounts.
• [ ] TOTP secrets live in Keystore / Keychain, biometric-gated.
• [ ] Push MFA signs a server-provided challenge (not a boolean approval).
• [ ] Number matching or equivalent anti-fatigue control is in place.
• [ ] Backup codes and/or passkey recovery are offered at enrollment.
• [ ] Account recovery is explicitly slower / more verified than normal login.
• [ ] Passkeys are supported where the platform allows.