transilienceai/communitytools

authenticated-session-acquisition

Acquire an authenticated session THROUGH MFA/OTP on an in-scope target and emit a reusable session artifact (Playwright storageState + Bearer) so executors can test the post-auth attack surface.

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How to use

  1. Copy the installation command and review the source package before installing it in your own agent environment.
  2. Check the source document for required tools, credentials and supported hosts.
  3. Describe your input and desired deliverable; review the output against the source material.
npx skills add https://github.com/transilienceai/communitytools --skill authenticated-session-acquisition

Before you start

  • Installation does not include a model subscription, API allowance or permission to access your files.
  • Repository stars and installation counts describe activity, not an independent quality or security test.
Original skill document

Rendered from the source repository. Headings, examples, code, tables, links, and referenced images are preserved.

Authenticated Session Acquisition

On financial and multi-tenant targets the login is gated by SMS OTP / TOTP MFA that an autonomous run cannot satisfy, so the post-auth surface (BOLA/IDOR/mass-assignment/injection on the real data APIs, session handling, API pivots) silently collapses to pre-auth findings only. This skill's job is narrow and concrete: get one legitimate authenticated session and hand it to the executors as a reusable artifact. It does not attack the auth mechanism — see `authentication` for that.

The artifact contract (how the session reaches executors)

Emit both, into the engagement's OUTPUT_DIR, referenced BY NAME (never inline secrets — `credential-loading.md`):

  • OUTPUT_DIR/<asset>/session/storageState.json — the Playwright storage state (cookies + localStorage) for browser-driven post-auth testing.
  • OUTPUT_DIR/<asset>/session/bearer.txt — the raw access/ID token (+ its expires_at) for direct API replay.

Executors consume these exactly like any env-loaded secret: the scope file's creds_env names the realm, and the session path is passed as a file reference, so no token is ever written into a prompt, experiments.md, or attack-chain.md. Re-run this skill when the token expires (record expires_at; refresh rather than re-login where a refresh token exists).

Modes (pick by what the client can provide)

ModeWhenHow
TOTP-from-seedThe client shared the TOTP secret (Base32 seed) for a test accountGenerate the current code deterministically with `tools/totp_now.py` <BASE32_SEED>, submit it in the login flow. Fully autonomous, repeatable.
Explicit-OTPThe operator can read a one-time code (SMS/email/authenticator) at run timeDrive login to the OTP prompt, the operator supplies the code once, continue.
Human-in-the-loop resumeOTP arrives out-of-band and the run must pausePersist the pre-OTP browser context, pause; the operator completes the challenge; resume and capture storageState.

Provider recipes

Detailed per-IdP flows are in `reference/session-acquisition.md`: Auth0, Okta, Amazon Cognito (SRP auth + the UNSIGNED unauthenticated-posture check), and Descope. Each recipe ends by exporting storageState.json + bearer.txt in the contract above.

When a session cannot be acquired — defer honestly, do not fake

If no test account / OTP seed is available and no OTP can be relayed, the realm's post-auth surface is untestable through no fault of the tester. Record it honestly instead of a fabricated NA or a silent miss:

  1. File a client-input request at reports/client-input-requests/CIR-NNN.md naming exactly what's needed ("needs test account / OTP seed / allowlist for <realm>").
  2. Set a realm-level BLOCKED_REASON in attack-chain.md.
  3. Mark that realm's post-auth coverage cells status:"deferred" in coverage.json, each carrying deferral_reason + client_input_request (the CIR path) — see `coverage-matrix.md`. The deterministic gate then discloses the deferred surface in the report rather than hiding it, and only the parent orchestrator (via coverage_gate.py --accept-deferrals) may finalize a substantiated-deferred engagement. A scope that is entirely auth-gated never completes.

The preflight cred-reach probe (`preflight-checklist.md`, Phase-1 gate) is what triggers this path: present creds are not working creds; verify reachability per realm before spawning post-auth executors.

Workflow

  1. Read the scope: which realms/tenants are in creds_env, which assets are behind them, roe.reversible_writes for the test tenant.
  2. Identify the IdP (login redirect host / /.well-known/openid-configuration / SDK bundle) → pick the recipe.
  3. Acquire the session in the appropriate mode → write storageState.json + bearer.txt.
  4. Verify: one minimal authenticated request returns an authorized response (not 401/403/login-redirect).
  5. Hand the artifact paths to the post-auth executor batch; on failure, run the defer path above.

Anti-Patterns

  • Do not paste tokens, seeds, or cookies into prompts, experiments.md, attack-chain.md, or any tools/*.md — reference the artifact file by path only.
  • Do not brute-force or bypass the OTP/MFA challenge here — that is an authentication finding, not session acquisition.
  • Do not mark an MFA-blocked cell covered/NA — mark it deferred with a filed CIR so the gate discloses it.
  • Do not test outside the authenticated tenant you were given, and honor roe.reversible_writes (create-then-delete only in your own test tenant).

Reference

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